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THE JAPANESE AMERICAN CASES-A DISASTER
EUGENE V. ROSTOWt
"He [the King of Great Britain] has affected to render the Mili-
tary independent of and superior to the Civil Power."
THE DEcLARATrOi OF INMEPEvN ENC
"War is too serious a business to be left to generals."
CLE!MENEAU
I
OuR war-time treatment of Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese
descent on the West Coast has been hasty, unnecessary and mistaken.
The course of action which we undertook was in no way required or
justified by the circumstances of the war. It was calculated to produce
both individual injustice and deep-seated social maladjustments of a
cumulative and sinister kind. I
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
The following short-form citations will be used: ToLAI; CO!UTr E HEANGS: Hear-
ings before House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration pursuant to H.
Res. 113, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); ToLAN CO =- TTrEE REroRxs (Preliminary) and
(Fourth Interim): H. R. REP. No. 1911 (Preliminary Report and Recommendations) and
H. R. REP. No. 2124 (Fourth Interim Report), 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); DEWIT FIAL
REPORT: U. S. ARiMYn, VESTERN DEFENSE COmMAND, FINAL REPORT, JAP.uSE EVACUIA-
TIONr osx E sWEST COAST, 1942 (1943, released 1944).
1. See Message from the President of the United States, Segregation of Loyal and
Disloyal Japanese in Relocation Centers, Report on S. Res. 166, 78th Cong., 1st Secs., S.
Doc. No. 69 (1943); TOLAN ComrEE REPoRTs (Preliminary and Fourth Interim);
McWIrLIAms, PREJunlcE (1944); McWILLIAMS, AV-x Anou OUR JARWESE A MrCAz;s
(1944); LEIGHTON, THE GovERNING OF MEN (1945); An Intelligence Officer, The Japanese
in America: The Problem and the Solution (1942) 185 HARPER's 439; Miyamoto, Immigrants
and Citizens of Japanese Origin (1942) 223 ANNALS 107; Fisher, What Race Bailing Costs
America (1943) 60 CHmIsTIAN CEwrunr- 1009; Heath, Wtqa About Hugh Kiino? (1943) 187
HARPER'S 450; "Issei, Nisei, Kibei" (April 1944) 29 FoRTUNE S; Beliquist, Report on the
Question of Transferring the Japanese from the Pacifi Coast (1942) 29 ToLui Cocrnn.x.
HEArNGs 11240; La Violette, The Anerican-Born Japanese and the World Crisis (1941) 7
CAN. J. EcoN. & PoL. Sci. 517; Redfield, The Japanese-Americans, in OcnurTI (ed.),
AamlaRcAN Socsar iN W.ARTPSm (1943) 143; Stonequist, The Restricted Citizen (1942) 223
ANNALS 149.
The War Relocation Authority has compiled an admirable bibliography on Japane-ce
and Japanese Americans in the United States; Parts I and II were published November 7,
1942, and Part III August 14, 1943. The Pacific Citizen, a newspaper published in Salt Lake
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All in all, the internment of the West Coast Japanese is the worst
blow our liberties have sustained in many years. Over one hundred
thousand men, women and children have been imprisoned, some
seventy thousand of them citizens of the United States, without indict-
ment or the proffer of charges, pending inquiry into their "loyalty."
They were taken into custody as a military measure on the ground that
espionage and sabotage were especially to be feared from persons of
Japanese blood. They were removed from the West Coast area because
the military thought it would take too long to conduct individual
loyalty investigations on the ground. They were arrested in an area
where the courts were open, and freely functioning. They were held
under prison conditions in uncomfortable camps, far from their homes,
and for lengthy periods-several years in many cases. If found "dis-
loyal" in administrative proceedings they were confined indefinitely,
although no statute makes "disloyalty" a crime; it would be difficult
indeed for a statute to do so under a Constitution which has been inter-
preted to minimize imprisonment for political opinions, both by de-
fining the crime of treason in extremely rigid and explicit terms, and
by limiting convictions for sedition and like offenses. 2 In the course of
relocation citizens have suffered severe property losses, despite some
custodial assistance by the GovernmentA Perhaps 70,000 persons are
still in camps, "loyal" and "disloyal" citizens and aliens alike, more
than three years after the programs were instituted. Although the
process of relocation has been recently accelerated, many will remain
in the camps at least until January 2, 1946. 4
By the time the question reached the Supreme Court, the crisis
which was supposed to justify the action had passed. The Court faced
two issues: should it automatically accept the judgment of the military
as to the need for the relocation program, or should it require a judicial
City by the Japanese American Citizens League is an indispensable source of material on
events and attitudes with respect to the process of evacuation, internment and relocation.
2. See Cramer v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 918 (U. S. 1945) (treason). For the evi-
dence required to justify imprisonment for attacking the loyalty of the armed forces, see
Hartzel v. United States, 322 U. S. 680 (1944). It is notable that persons--citizens or
aliens-who actively propagandize in favor of the Axis cause cannot be convicted of sedition,
nor placed into protective custody, although loyal citizens of Japanese descent can be ar-
rested and held in preventive custody fo periods of more than three years. See also Keegan
v. United States, 65 Sup. Ct. 1203 (U. S. 1945), which reverses the conviction of active
members of the German-American Bund, a Nazi organization, for conspiracy to obstruct
the draft. Apparently the defendants included persons of German nationality as well an of
German descent, id. at 1212. As for the difficulty of obtaining individual exclusion orders
against persons-usually naturalized citizens-with strong German political affiliations,
see cases cited infra note 13.
3. On the handling of evacuees' property see WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY, A STATE-
mENT ON HANDLING OF EVACUEE PROPERTY (May 1943); DEWITT FINAL REI'ORT, c. x;
ToLN CommiTTEE REPORTS (Fourth Interim) 173-97.
4. See Myer, The WRA Says "Thirty" (1945) 112 NEw REPUBLIC 867.
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investigation of the question? Was there factual support for the mili-
tary judgment that the course of the war required the exclusion and
confinement of the Japanese American population of the West Coast?
Clearly, if such steps were not necessary to the prosecution of the war,
they invaded rights protected by the Third Article of the Constitution,
and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
If the Court had stepped forward in bold heart to vindicate the law
and declare the entire program illegal, the episode would have been
passed over as a national scandal, but a temporary one altogether
capable of reparation. But the Court, after timid and evasive delays,
has now upheld the main features of the program.5 That step con-
verts a piece of war-time folly into political doctrine, and a perma-
nent part of the law. Moreover, it affects a peculiarly important and
sensitive part of the law. The relationship of civil to military author-
ity is not often litigated. It is nonetheless one of the two or three most
essential elements in the legal structure of a democratic society. The
Court's few declarations on the subject govern the handling of vast
affairs. They determine the essential organization of the military es-
tablishment, state and federal, in time of emergency or of war, as well
as of peace. What the Supreme Court has done in these cases, and
especially in Korematsu v. United States, is to increase the strength of
the military in relation to civil government. It has upheld an act of
military power without a factual record in which the justification for
the act was analyzed. Thus it has created doubt as to the standards of
responsibility to which the military power will be held. For the first
time in American legal history, the Court has seriously weakened the
protection of our basic civil right, the writ of habeas corpus. It has
established a precedent which may well be used to encourage attacks
on the civil rights of citizens and aliens, and may make it possible for
some of those attacks to succeed. It will give aid to reactionary politi-
cal programs which use social division and racial prejudice as tools for
conquering power. As Mr. Justice Jackson points out, the principle
of these cases "lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of
any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need." 6
5. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U. S. 214 (1944); Ex parle Mitsuye Endo, 323 U. S. 283 (1944). See FA=:xAr., Tun LAw
oF ARIiRAL. RULE (2d ed. 1943) 255-61; Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and tl:e Military
Judgment (1945) 45 COL. L. REv. 175; Fairman, The Law of Marlial Rr6lc and tMe National
Emergency (1942) 55 HAIv. L. REv. 1253; Freeman, Genesis, Exodus and Leviticus: Genca-
logy, Evacuation and the Law (1943) 28 Coir. L. Q. 414; Graham, Martial Law in California
(1942) 31 CALIF. L. REv. 6; Lerner, Freedom: Image and Rcality in SAFEGUAnDi:ZG Czm
LIBERTY TODAY (1945); Watson, The Japanese Eracuation and Litigation Arising Therefrom
(1942) 22 ORE. L. REv. 46; Wolfson, Legal Doctrine, War Power and Japanese Evaefuation
(1944) 32 Ky. L. J. 328; Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1316; Note (1943) I1 Gro. WAVs.
L. REv. 482.
6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,246 (1944).
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The opinions of the Supreme Court in the Japanese American cases
do not belong in the same political or intellectual universe with Ex
parte M/'illigan,7 DeJonge v. Oregon,8 Hague v. CIO,' or Mr. Justice
Brandeis' opinion in the Whitney case.'" They threaten even more
than the trial tradition of the common law and the status of individuals
in relation to the state. By their acceptance of ethnic differences as a
criterion for discrimination, these cases will make it more difficult to
resolve one of the central problems in American life-the problem of
minorities. They are a breach, potentially a major breach, in the
principle of equality. Unless repudiated, they may encourage dev-
astating and unforeseen social and political conflicts.
II
What General DeWitt did in the name of military precaution within
his Western Defense Command was quite different from the security
measures taken in Hawaii or on the East Coast-although both places
were more active theatres of war in 1942 than the states of Washington,
Oregon, California, and Arizona, which comprised the Western De-
fense Command.
On the East Coast, and in the United States generally, enemy aliens
were controlled without mass arrests or evacuations, despite a con-
siderable public agitation in favor of violent action. A registration
of aliens had been accomplished tinder the Alien Registration Act of
1940, and the police authorities had compiled information about
fascist sympathizers among the alien population, as well as about
those who were citizens. "On the- night of December 7, 1941," the
Attorney General has reported, "the most dangerous of the persons
in this group were taken into custody; in the following weeks a number
of others were apprehended. Each arrest was made on the basis of
information concerning the specific alien taken into custody. We have
used no dragnet techniques and have conducted no indiscriminate,
large-scale raids." 1 Immediately after Pearl Harbor restrictions were
7. 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1867).
8. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
9. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
10. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 372-80 (1927). See Professor Riesman's
thoughtful essay, Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition, in (1942) 3 PUBLIC POLICY 33;
CHLAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) passim, especially pp. 440-90; Lusky,
Minority Rights and the Public Interest (1942) 52 YALE L. J. 1.
11. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,
1942 (1943) 14. In the first few weeks of war, 2,971 enemy aliens were taken into custody,
1,484 Japanese, 1,256 Germans and 231 Italians. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1942, § IV, p. 8,
col. 3. The basic Presidential proclamations on the treatment of enemy aliens appear in
6 FED. REG. 6321, 6323, 6324 (1941). Regulations under them are issued from time to time
by the Attorney General. See, e.g., 7 FED. REG. 844 (1942). See TOLAN COSMITEE RE-
PORTS (Fourth Interim) 25; Biddle, Taking No Chances, Collier's, March 21, 1942, p. 21;
[Vol. 54.,489
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imposed upon the conduct of all enemy.aliens over 14 years of age.
They were forbidden the Canal Zone and certain restricted military
areas thereafter to be specified. They were not to leave the country,
travel in a plane, change their place of abode, or travel about outside
their own communities, without special permission. They were for-
bidden to own or use firearms, cameras, short-wave radio sets, codes,
ciphers or invisible ink. The District Attorneys were given broad dis-
cretion to allow aliens of enemy nationality to carry on their usual
occupations, under scrutiny, but without other restriction. A new
registration of aliens of enemy nationality was conducted. The basic
object of the control plan was to keep security officers informed, but
otherwise to allow the aliens almost their normal share in the work and
life of the community.
Aliens under suspicion, and those who violated the regulations, were
subject to summary arrest on Presidential warrant. "The law," the
Attorney General said, "does not require any hearing before the intern-
ment of an enemy alien. I believed that nevertheless, we should give
each enemy alien who had been taken into custody an opportunity for a
hearing on the question whether he should be interned." 12 Those ar-
rested were therefore promptly examined by voluntary Alien Enemy
Hearing Boards, consisting of citizens appointed for the task by the
Attorney General. These Boards could recommend that individuals be
interned, paroled, or released unconditionally. This operation was
smoothly conducted, with a minimal interference with the standards
of justice in the community. Of the 1,100,000 enemy aliens in the
United States, 9,080 had been examined by the end of the fiscal year
1943; 4,119 were then interned, 3,705 paroled, 1,256 released, and 9,341
were still in custody. On June 30, 1944, the number in custody had
been reduced to 6,238. The number of those interned wmas then 2,525,
those paroled, 4,840, and those released, 1,926.13
Lasker, Friends or Enmies? (1942) 31 SURVEY GP,, mc 277; Rowe, The Alien Enemy
Program-So Far (Summer 1942) 2 Co.esoN GnorvND 19; Bentwich, Alien Enemies in the
United States (1943) 163 CoN-rEMP. REv. 225; Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1316.
12. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENEr.L FOR Fiscu. J YE.ARE_.D Juxn.T 30,
1942 (1943) 14.
13. The number in custody is greater than the number interned by reason of the in-
clusion of members of internees' families who request internment, as well as certain alien
enemy seamen and alien enemies held for Central and South American countries. See AN-
NUAL REPORT OF T'in ATToaieEY GENhER,,x FOR FIscAL YEaE ENMED JUNE 30, 1944 (1945) S.
A small number of citizens and enemy aliens suspected of a propensity for espionage or
sabotage by reason of their political opinions were ordered removed from designated security
areas both on the East and West Coasts under the statute of March 21, 1942, cited infra
note 27. This process met with notable judicial resistance. Schueller v. Drum, 51 F. Supp.
383 (E. D. Pa. 1943); Ebel v. Drum, 52 F. Supp. 189 (D. .Mass. 1943); Scherzberg v. Ma-
deria, 57 F. Supp. 42 (E. D. Pa. 1944). Cf. Labedz v. Kramer, 55 F. Supp. 25 (D. Ore.
1944); Ochikubo v. Bonesteel, 57 F. Supp. 513 (S. D. Calif. 1944). See also United States
v. Meyer, 140 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Alexander v. Dellitt, 141 F. (2d) 573 (C. C. A.
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In Hawaii a somewhat different procedure was followed, but one
less drastic than the evacuation program pursued on the West Coast.
Immediately after Pearl Harbor martial law was declared in Hawaii, and
the commanding general assumed the role of military governor. Courts
were reopened for some purposes shortly after the bombing raid, but
the return of civil law to Hawaii has been a slow, controversial process,
not yet complete. During the period of three and a half years after
Pearl Harbor, military power was installed'in Hawaii, constitutionally
or not, and the normal controls against arrest on suspicion were not
available. 14 The population of Hawaii is 500,000, of whom some
160,000, or 32%, were of Japanese descent. Despite the confusions
of the moment in Hawaii, only 700 to 800 Japanese aliens were ar-
rested and sent to the mainland for internment. In addition, fewer
than 1,100 persons of Japanese ancestry were transferred to the main-
land to relocation centers. These Japanese were arrested on the basis
of individual suspicion, resting on previous examination or observed
behavior, or they were families of interned aliens, transferred volun-
tarily. Of those transferred from Hawaii to the mainland, 912 were
citizens, the rest aliens.'5 Even under a regime of martial law, men
were arrested as individuals, and safety was assured without mass
arrests.
These procedures compare favorably in their essential character
with the precautions taken in Britain and France. The British pro-
cedure was the model for our general practice in dealing with enemy
aliens. The British Government began in 1939 by interning only those
enemy aliens who were on a "security list." Others were subjected to
minor police restrictions, pending their individual examination by
especially established tribunals. One hundred and twelve such tribu-
nals were set up, under citizens with legal experience, to examine all
enemy aliens in Britain. There was an appeals advisory committee to
advise the Home Secretary in disputed cases. Aliens were divided into
three classes: those judged dangerous were interned; if judged doubtful
9th, 1944). The standards developed in these cases to justify the exclusion of persons from
military areas as dangerous now closely correspond to those applied in sedition cases. Ex-
clusion will be sustained, that is, only on a showing of "clear and present danger," of aid to
the enemy, something more than opinions alone.
14. See FAInuAN, Tmn LAW OF MARTIAL RUIE (2d ed. 1943) 239-55; LIND, THE JAP-
ANESE IN HAWAII UNDER WAR CONDITIONS (1942); Anthony, Martial Law in Hawaii (1942)
30 CALIF. L. REV. 371, (1943) 31 CALIF. L. REV. 477; Frank, Ex parte Milligan v. The Five
Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii (1944) 44 COL. L. REV. 639; Coggins, The Japanese.
Americans in Hawaii (1943) 187 HARPER'S 75; Fisher, Our Two Japanese American Policies
(1943) 60 CHRImsTAN CENTURY 961; Henderson, Japan in Hawaii (1942) 31 SURVEY GiRAPnIC
328; Home, Are the Japs Hopeless?, Sat. Eve. Post, Sept. 9, 1944, p. 16; LIND, ECONOMIC
SUCCESSION AND RACIAL INVASION IN HAWAI (1936); LIND, AN ISLAND COMMUNITY (1938);
Smith, Minority Groups in Hawaii (1942) 223 ANNALS 36.
15. Communication from the Hon. Abe Fortas, Under Secretary of the Interior, June
28, 1945.
[Vol. 54:49
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in their loyalty, they were subjected to certain continuing restrictions,
especially as to travel, and the ownership of guns, cameras and radios;
those deemed entirely loyal to the Allied cause were freed without
further restraint. At first 2,000 enemy aliens on a black list were
interned. But the entire group was then examined individually, and
by March 1940 only 569 of approximately 75,000 aliens were ordered
interned. During the panic period of 1940, a new screening was under-
taken, to intern all those of doubtful loyalty, and other measures of
mass internment were undertaken. Beginning as early as July 1940,
however, the policy of wholesale internment was modified, and releases
were granted, either generally, or on certain conditions-the proved
politics of the internee, his joining the Auxiliary Pioneer Corps, his
emigration, and so on.", The maximum number interned, during July
1940, was about 27,000 of a total enemy alien population (German,
Austrian and Italian) of about 93,000. By September 1941, the number
of internees dropped to about 8,500. At the same time, the British
undertook to arrest certain British subjects on suspicion alone, under
the Emergency Powers Act of 1939. A constitutional storm was
aroused by this procedure, which was finally resolved in favor of the
government.17 The general pattern of British security practice was
thus to treat enemy aliens on an individual basis, and to arrest British
subjects of fascist tendencies in a limited number, and then only on
strong personal suspicion.
In France all men enemy aliens between the ages of 17 and 65 were
interned in 1939. After a good deal of confusion and complaint, and a
vigorous parliamentary protest, many were screened out, either upon
joining the Foreign Legion, or, for older men, upon examination, and
sponsorship by French citizens. Further parliamentary criticism in
December 1939 led to relief for the internees, but the crisis of May and
June, 1940, produced mass internment. In France, though less effec-
tively than in Britain, the principle of internment on an individual
basis was the objective of policy, if not always its norm. 5
But on the West Coast the security program was something else
again. A policy emerged piecemeal, apparently without sponsors or
16. Report, The Position of Aliens in Great Britain During tMe War (1942) 31 TorA
CommIt=E HEARIGS 11861; Koessler, Enemy Alien Internment: With Sp.-dal Refercree to
Great Britain and France (1942) 57 PoL. Sri. Q. 98; Kempner, The Enemy Alien Protbem in
the Present War (1940) 34 Am. J. INT. L. 443; Kohn, Legal Asprds of Internmt (1941) 4
MoD. L. RFv. 200; Feist, The Status of Refugees (1941) 5 MOD. L. Riv. 51.
17. Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A. C. 206; Greene v. Secretary of State [19421 A. C.
284; Keeton, Liversidge v. Anderson (1942) 5 MoD. L. Rsv. 162; Alien, Regulation 18B a d
Reasonable Cause (1942) 5S L. Q. Rnv. 232; Goodhart, Notes (1942) 58 L. Q. Rn. 3, 9, and
A Short Replication (1942) 58 L. Q. REv. 243; Holdsworth, Note (1942) 58 L. Q. Rnv. 1;
Carr, A Regulated Liberty (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv. 339, and Crisis Legislalion in Britain
(1940) 40 COL. L. R.Ev. 1309.
18. See Koessler, supra note 16, at 114edseg.
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forethought. By May 1, 1942, it had become a policy of evacuating all
persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast, and confining them
indefinitely in camps located away from the coastal area. After some
hesitation, General DeWitt proposed evacuation. Quite clearly, a
conflict took place between the military authorities on the West Coast
and some of the representatives of the Department of Justice over the
justification for such action. 9 But no one in the Government would
take the responsibility for overruling General DeWitt and the War
Department which backed him up.
The dominant factor in the development of this policy was not a
military estimate of a military problem, but familiar West Coast
attitudes of race prejudice. The program of excluding all persons of
Japanese ancestry from the coastal area was conceived and put through
by the organized minority whose business it has been for forty-five
years to increase and exploit racial tensions on the West Coast. The
Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, and their sympathiz-
ers, were lucky in their general, for General DeWitt amply proved
himself to be one of them.in opinion and iralues. As events happened,
he became the chief policy maker in the situation, and he has caused
more damage even than General Burnside in 1863, whose blunderings
with Vallandigham, the Ohio Copperhead, were the previous high in
American military officiousness.21
In the period immediately after Pearl Harbor there was no special
security program on the West Coast for persons of Japanese extraction,
and no general conviction that a special program was needed.2 1 Known
enemy sympathizers among the Japanese, like white traitors and enemy
agents, were arrested. There was no sabotage on the part of persons of
Japanese ancestry, either in Hawaii or on the West Coast. There was
no reason to suppose that the 112,000 persons of Japanese descent on
the West Coast, 1.2% of the population, constituted a greater menace
,to safety than such persons in Hawaii, 32% of the Territory's popula-
tion. Their access to military installations was not substantially
different in the two areas; their status in society was quite similar;
19. See DEWITT FINAL REPORT at 3, 7, 19. Mr. Tom Clark (now the Attorney General)
stated that mass evacuation was not contemplated as necessary on Feb. 23, 1942. 29 TOLAN
COMMITTEE HEARINGS 11164. '
20. See 2 SANDBURG, ABRAHAm LINCOLN, THE WAR YEARS (1939) 160-5. President
Lincoln wrote to General Burnside, "All the Cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting for
instance Vallandigham-some perhaps doubting that there was a real necessity for it, but
being done all were for seeing you through with it." Lincoln arranged to have Vallandigham
passed through the Confederate lines and banished. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
UNDER LINCOLN (1926) 176-9. The text of Lincoln's remarks is given somewhat differently
by Sandburg and Randall. See also KLAUS, THE MILLIGAN CASE (1929) 12-6.
21. See Rowell, Clash of Two Worlds (1942) 31 SURVEY GRAPHIC 9, 12; MCWILLIAMS,
PREJUDICE (1944) 108-14; ToLAN COMMITTEE REPORTS (Fourth Interim) 154-6; An In-
telligence Officer, The Japanese in America: The Problem and the Solution (1942) 185 HARr-
ER'S 489.
I
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their proved record of loyalty in the war has been the same. Although
many white persons were arrested, and convicted, as Japanese agents,
no resident Japanese American has so far been convicted of sabotage or
espionage as an agent of Japan.
22
After a month's silence, the professional anti-Oriental agitators of
the West Coast began a comprehensive campaign. There had been no
sabotage in the area, although there was evidence of radio signaling
from unknown persons within the area to enemy ships at sea. The
West Coast Congressional delegation, led by Senator Hiram Johnson,
hemorialized the Administration in favor of excluding all persons of
Japanese lineage from the coastal area. Anti-Oriental spokesmen ap-
peared as witnesses before the Tolan Committee,23 and later the Dies
Committee,24 and they explained the situation as they conceived of it
to General DeWitt. 25 Some of the coast newspapers, and particularly
those owned by William Randolph Hearst, took up the cry. Politicians,
fearful of an unknown public opinion, spoke out for white supremacy.
Tension was intensified, and doubters, worried about the risks of an-
other Pearl Harbor, remained silent, preferring too much caution to
too little. An opinion crystallized in favor of evacuating the Japanese.
Such action was at least action, promising greater relief from tension
than the slow, patient work of military preparation for the defense and
counter-attack. German and Italian aliens were too numerous to be
arrested or severely confined, and they were closely connected with
powerful blocs of voters. There were too many Japanese Americans
in Hawaii to be moved. The 100,000 persons of Japanese descent on
the West Coast thus became the chief available target for the release
of frustration and aggression.
Despite the nature of the emergency, the military refused to act
without fuller legal authority. Executive Order No. 9066 was issued on
February 19, 1942, authorizing the Secretary of War, and military
commanders he might designate, to prescribe "military areas" in their
discretion, and either to exclude any or all persons from such areas, or
to establish the conditions on which any or all such persons might enter,
remain in or leave such areas.6 Lieutenant General J. L. Dellitt, head
of the Vestern Defense Command, was ordered on February 20, 1942,
to carry out the policy of the Executive Order. During the first two
weeks of March, more than three months after Pearl Harbor, General
DeWitt issued orders in which he announced that he would subse-
22. See MlcWliLLImAs, PREJUDICE (1944) 111.
23. 29 ToLAx CO!.ITTEE Hza.uNGs -10973, 11061, 11063, 11037, 11111; 30 id. at
11303-6,11314-21, 11325;31id.at 11642.
24. Hearings before Special Committee on Un-Atnerican Adirilics on H. Res. 282, 7Sth
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), vols. 15, 16.
25. 31 ToLAN COSXMITTEE HEARINGS 11643; Hearings before Special Committee on Un-
American Activities, supra note 24, vol. 15, p. 9207.
26. 7 FED. REG. 1407 (1942L "
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quently exclude "such persons or classes of persons as the situation
may require" from the area.
But the Army's lawyers wanted more authority than the Executive
Order. With inevitable further delays, a statute was therefore obtained
prescribing that
". .. whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in
any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority
of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or
by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War,
contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or
contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military
commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known
of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his
act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to im-
prisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense." 27
The statute thus authorized the exclusion of people from the military
areas. It said nothing about their subsequent confinement in camps.
This omission was seized upon in Ex parte Endo as a crucial fact limit-
ing the power of the Government to hold persons shifted under military
orders to relocation centers .28
Starting on March 27, 1942, almost four months after Pearl Harbor,
the first actual restrictions were imposed. A policy of encouraging the
Japanese to move away on a voluntary and individual basis had shown
signs of producing confusion and irritation. 29 It was decided to have a
uniform and comprehensive program of governmentally controlled
migration. At first Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese ancestry
were subjected to the same controls applied to German and Italian
aliens. Citizens of German and Italian descent were left free. Early in
April, the first of a series of civilian exclusion orders were issued. They
applied only to Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese descent, who
were to be excluded altogether from West Coast areas, ordered to re-
port to control stations, and then confined in camps conducted by the
newly organized War Relocation Authority, which became an agency of
the Department of Interior on February 16, 1944.3O
27. 56 STAT. 173 (1942), 18 U. S. C. § 97a (Supp. 1943).
28. .Ex pare Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300-1 (1944).
29. See DEWiTT FINAL REPORT, c. ix. But see Fisher, Japanese Colony: Success Story
(1943) 32 SURVEY GRAPHIC 41.
30. Public Proclamations No. 1, 7 FED. REG. 2320 (1942), No. 2, 7 FED. REG. 2405
(1942), No. 3, 7 FED. REG. 2543 (1942), and other public proclamations established restric-
tions on travel, residence, and activities for enemy aliens and citizens of Japanese extrac-
tion. Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1, March 24, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 2581 (1942), and subse-
quent exclusion orders established the basis of evacuation. Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34,
7 FED. REG. 3967 (1942), was the basis of Korematsu's case. The War Relocation Authority
was established by Executive Order 9102, 7 FED. REG. 2165 (1942).
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The rules and policies of these camps were perhaps the most strildng
part of the entire program. Despite the humanitarian character of the
WRA, which was from the beginning intrusted to high-minded and
well-meaning men, a policy for discharging Japanese was developed
which encouraged lawlessness and refused support to the simplest con-
stitutional rights of citizens and aliens. It was origipally thought that
the camps would give temporary haven to some Japanese refugees from
the West Coast who could not easily arrange new homes, jobs and lives
for themselves. Then it w-as decided to make a stay in the camps com-
pulsory, so as to facilitate the loyalty examinations which were sup-
posed to have been too difficult and prolonged to conduct on the West
Coast. Further, it was xsely decided that a loyalty "screening" would
facilitate relocation and combat anti-Japanese agitation. The fact that
all released evacuees had been approved, so far as loyalty was con-
cerned, gave practical support to their position in new communities.
Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese origin found by this adminis-
trative process to be disloyal were confined indefinitely in a special
camp. Persons of Japanese descent found to be loyal were to be re-
leased from the camps upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. As
applied to citizens especially, those conditions upon the right to live
and travel in the United States are so extraordinary as to require full
statement:
"In the case of each application for indefinite leAve, the Director,
upon receipt of such file from the Project Director, will secure from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation such information as may be
obtainable, and will take such steps as may be necessary to satisfy
himself concerning the applicant's means of support, his willingness
to make the reports required of him under the provisions of this
part, the conditions and factors affecting the applicant's opportun-
ity for employment and residence at the proposed destination, the
probable effect of the issuance of the leave upon the war program
and upon the public peace and security, and such other condi-
tions and factors as may be relevant. The Director will thereupon
send instructions to the Project Director to issue or deny such
leave in each case, and will inform the Regional Director of the in-
structions so issued. The Project Director shall issue indefinite
leaves pursuant to such instructions.
"(f) A leave shall issue to an applicant in accordance with his
application in each case, subject to the provisions of this Part and
under the procedures herein provided, as a matter of right, where
the applicant has made arrangements for employment or other
means of support, where he agrees to make the reports required of
him under the provisions of this Part and to comply with all other
applicable provisions hereof, and where there is no reasonable cause
to believe that applicant cannot successfully maintain employment
and residence at the proposed destination, and no reasonable
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ground to believe that the issuance of a leave in the particular case
will interfere with the war program or otherwise endanger the
public peace and security.
"(g) The Director, the Regional Director, and the Project Di-
rector may attach such special conditions to the leave to be issued'
in a particular case as may be necessary in the public interest." 31
In other words, loyal citizens were required to have official approval
of their homes, jobs and friends before they were allowed to move.
They had to report subsequent changes of address, and remain under
scrutiny almost amounting to parole. Officials were required to ascer-
tain that community sentiment was not unfavorable to the presence
of such citizens before they were permitted to enter the community.
The briefs in behalf of the United States before the Supreme Court in
the Korematsu and Endo cases explain the kind of evidence regarded as
sufficient to uphold a finding of unfavorable community sentiment, and
a suspension of the relocation process: the introduction of ianti-Japanese
bills in the local legislature, the occurrence of riots or other lawless
episodes, and similar expressions of minority opinion. 
32
This policy played a part in encouraging the growth and violent ex-
pression of race antagonisms in American society. The forces of the
national government were not devoted to protecting and vindicating
what Edwards v. California had recently upheld as the privilege of a
United States citizen, or indeed of any resident, to move freely from
state to state, without interference. 33 Local lynch spirit was not con-
31. War Relocation Authority, Issuance of Leave for Departure fron a Relocation Area,
7 FED. REG. 7656, 7657 (1942). These regulations were revised in detail from time to time,
but their basic policy was not substantially altered. See War Relocation Authority, Admin-
istrative Notice No. 54 (Summary of Leave Clearance Procedures), March 28, 1944. The
basic security data on an evacuee is provided by the FBI and other intelligence agencies,
not by independent investigation. This data is supplemented by his answers to question-
naires, particularly as to his loyalty to the United States, and by field investigations in
doubtful cases. These field investigations include irtterviews with the evacuee. An appeal is
provided to a Board of Appeals for leave clearance, consisting of citizens not employed by
the War Relocation Authority. This Board has the power to advise the Director. Actually,
leave was granted pending inquiry in cases where the applicant did not have an adverse
FBI record; had answered the loyalty questions affirmatively; was not a Shinto priest;
and had not spent the larger part of his life in Japan. Thus in fact Japanese Americans were
given permission to leave the camps and, after the decision in the Endo case, to return to
their homes, on the basis of very little information, beyond their answers to questionnaires,
which was not available on the West Coast in 1942. Administrative Notice No. 54, supra.
See discussion of issues in the report of the House Special Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities, H. R. REP. No. 717, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 13-6, 25.
32. Brief for United States, pp. 35-6, Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U. S. 283 (1944);
Brief for United States, p. 15, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944).
33. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941). Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy
and Jackson concurred specially on ihe ground that California's ban on indigent migrants
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trolled and punished by the agencies of law enforcement. On the con-
trary, it was encouraged to manifest itself in words and unpunished
deeds. The threat of lawlessness was allowed to frustrate the legal
rights of colored minorities unpopular with small and articulate minori-
ties of white citizens. In March 1943, a small number of Japanese re-
turned to their homes in Arizona, which had been removed from the
military zone, without substantial incident.34 In the spring of 1945,
however, the Ku Klux Klan spirit in California had been manifested in
at least twenty major episodes of arson or intimidation." The War
Relocation Authority has been consistently and effectively on the side
of facilitating resettlement and combatting race prejudice. Yet the
terms of its leave regulations constituted an extraordinary invasioti of
citizens' rights, as the Supreme Court later held. They were a practi-
cal compromise, under the circumstances, but a compromise nonethe-
less, with social forces which might better have been opposed head-on.
Studies are beginning to appear about conditions within the camps.
from the South West was not only an unconstitutional interference vith commerce, but a
violation of privileges and immunities of national citizenship. See Myers, Federal Pritiles
and I-mmunities:Application to Ingress and Egress (1944) 29 Comai. L. Q. 489.
34. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA BmtrrA a CA BooK OF THE YEAR: 1944 (1944) 47.
35. Are Japs Wanted?, New;sweek, May 28, 1945, p. 33. Including minor epiodes, there
were 59 such incidents by the end of April 1945. See N, Y. Times, May 6, 1945, § IV, p. 7,
col. 4. Some of the episodes are terroristic shooting by night riders; others are arzon, the
desecration of cemeteries, posting of approbious handbills, etc.; still others are commercial
boycotts, like the refusal of Portland, Ore., vegetable merchants (largely'of Italian dezcent)
to buy farm produce from a Japanese American farmer. See Pacific Citizen, May 5, 1945,
p. 5, col. 4. See also N. Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1945, p. 4, cal. 7; id., Jan. 21, 1945, p. 4, cal. 3;
id., Feb. 17, 1945, p. 2, col. 5; id., Feb. 25, p. 26, col. 4; id., March 13, 1945, p. 17, cal. 1.
Both West Coast judges and juries have so far tended to acquit persons charged vith %io-
lence directed against the Japanese, often after confessions by defendants and inflammatory
appeals by defense counsel. See Pacific Citizen, April 28, 1945, p. 1, col. 4; p. 4, cal. 1 ("This
is a white man's country"); (1945) 160 Tn NATioN 531, 593. Labor leaders, historically
one of the strongest anti-Japanese groups in West Coast life, are in the forefront of reistance
to the return of the Japanese to their homes. See, e.g., the position of Dave Beck, reported
in The Pacific Citizen, April 21, 1945, p. 4, cal. 2; p. 5, col. 4.
Strong reactions of opinion and of citizens groups in favor of protecting the rights of
Japanese Americans have been manifested, led by Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of
Interior Ickes, and the staff of the War Relocation Authority. See Pacific Citizen, April 7,
1945, p. 1, col. 1, quoting Secretary Ickes' forceful statement of April 4, 1945; Pacific Citi-
zen, April 14, 1945, p. 2, col. 1 (Secretary Stimson's remarks at press conference of April 5).
Many West Coast groups have been organized to oppose the Klan movement in the Far
West. See Pacific Citizen, April 28, 1945, p. 7, col. 1; id., April 21, 1945, p. 3, cal. 1. Se
excellent speech of Attorney General Robert NV Kenny of California, delivered to a con-
vention of California sheriffs, calling on law enforcement officers to protect the legal rights
of returning Japanese Americans. N. Y. Times, March 18, 1945, p. 17, col. 1; Pacific Citi-
zen, March 24, 1945, p. 1, cal. 4; id., March 31, 1945, p. 5, cal. 1 (partial text of Mr. Kenny's
speech); Beshoar, Whien Good Will Is Organized (Spring 1945) 5 Conrmo! Gnoutm 19;
Pacific Citizen, March 3, 1945, p. 6, cal. 1 (speech by Joe E. Brown before Commonwealth
Club of San Francisco in behalf of fair play for Japanese Americans); Time, May 28, 1945,
p. 13 (Quakers aid returned evacuees in Oregon).
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They make it plain that the camps were in fact concentration camps,
where the humiliation of evacuation was compounded by a regime
which ignored citizens' rights, and the amenities which might have
made the relocation process more palatable. 6
Thus there developed a system for the indefinite confinement and
detention of Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese descent, without
charges or trial, without term, and without visible promise of relief.
By May 1942, it was compulsory and self-contained. On pain of pun-
ishment under the Act of March 21, 1942, all had to leave the West
Coast through Assembly Centers and the Relocation Centers. Counsel
in the Hirabayashi case called it slavery; Mr. Justice'Jackson said it
was attainder of blood." The Japanese radio discussed it at length,
finding in the system ample propaganda material for its thesis that
American society was incapable of dealing justly with colored peoples.
III
Attempts were made at once to test the legality of the program. The
district courts and the circuit courts of appeals had a good deal of
difficulty with the issues. Although troubled, they generally upheld
both the exclusion of Japanese aliens and citizens from the West Coast,
and at least their temporary confinement in WRA camps.3"
The question of how and on what grounds the Supreme Court should
dispose of the cases was one of broad political policy. Would a repudia-
tion of the Congress, the President and the military in one aspect of
their conduct of the war affect the people's will to fight? Would it
create a campaign issue for 1944? Would it affect the po.wer, status and
prestige of the Supreme Court as a political institution? How would a
decision upholding the Government influence civil liberties and the
condition of minorities? A bench of sedentary civilians was reluctant
to overrule the military decision of those charged with carrying on the
war. Conflicting loyalties, ambitions and conceptions of the Court's
duty undoubtedly had their part in the positions the justices took.
The issue first came before the Supreme Court in May 1943, and the
first cases, Hirabayashi v. United States and Yasui v. United States, were
decided on June 21, 1943.11 No Japanese submarines had been detected
off the West Coast for many months. Midway was won; Libya,
Tripolitania and Tunisia had been conquered. Guadalcanal and a good
deal of New Guinea were in Allied hands. The posture of the war had
changed profoundly in a year. We had suffered no defeats since the
36. See LEIGHTON, op. cit. supra note 1.
37. Brief for Northern California Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, p. 93;
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 243 (1944).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40 (D. Ore. 1942); Korematsu v.
United States, 140 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943).
39. 320 U.S. 81 and 115 (1943).
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fall of Tobruk in July 1942, and we had won a long series of preliminar,
victories. Our forces were poised for the offensive. The phase of ag-
gressive deployment was over.
The problem presented to the Supreme Court was thus completely
different from that which confronted worried legislators and officials in
the bleak winter and spring of 1942. Invalidation of the exclusion and
confinement programs would do no possible harm to the prosecution of
the war. The Court could afford to view the issues in full perspective.
The war powers of the legislative and executive must of course be
amply protected. But the special concerns of the Supreme Court for
the development of constitutional law as a whole could be given proper
weight, free of the pressure of the Pearl Harbor emergency.
It was only half the truth to say that the cases had to be decided as
if the date of decision were February 1942. It was not in fact the date
of decision, and could not be made so. The issue was not only whether
the military should have excluded the Japanese in the spring of 1942,
but whether the Court should now validate what had been done. As
many episodes in the history of the United States eloquently attest,
these are different issues. The problem of the Court in the Hirabayaslhi
case was not that of General DeWitt in 1942, but an infinitely more
complex one. Whether it faced the issues or tried to ignore them,
whether it decided the cases frankly or obliquely, by decision or eva-
sion, the Court could not escape the fact that it was the Supreme Court,
arbiter of a vast system of rules, habits, customs and relationships. No
matter how inarticulate, its decision could not be confined in its effect
to the United States Reports. It would necessarily alter the balance of
forces determining the condition of every social interest within range
of the problems of the cases-the power of the military and the police;
our developing law of emergencies, which is beginning to resemble the
French and German law of the state of siege; the status of minorities
and of groups which live by attacking minorities; the future decision of
cases in police stations and lower courts, involving the writ of habeas
corpus, the equal rights of citizens, the protection of aliens, the segrega-
tion of racial groups, and like questions.
In a bewildering and unimpressive series of opinions, relieved only by
the dissents of Mr. Justice Roberts and of -Mr. Justice 'Murphy in
Korenmztsu v. United States,"' the Court chose to assume that the main
issue of the cases-the scope and method of judicial review of military
decisions-did not exist. In the political process of American life, these
decisions were a negative and reactionary act. The Court avoided the
risks of overruling the Government on an issue of war policy. But it
weakened society's control over military authority-one of the polariz-
ing forces on which the organization of our society depends. And it
40. 323 U.S. 214, 225, 233 (1944).
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solemnly accepted and gave the prestige of its support to dangerous
racial myths about a minority group, in arguments which can be
applied easily to any other minority in our society.
The cases are worth separate statement, for they are by no means
alike. In Hirabayashi v. United States the Court considered a conviction
based on the Act of March 21, 1942, for violating two orders issued by
General DeWitt under authority of the Executive Order of February
19, 1942. Gordon Hirabayashi, a citizen of the United States and a
senior in the University of Washington, was sentenced to three months
in prison on each of two counts, the sentences running concurrently.
The first count was that Hirabayashi failed to report to a control
station on May 11 or May 12, 1942, for exclusion from the duly desig-
nated military area including Seattle, hi home. The first count thus
raised the legality of the compulsory transportation of an American
citizen from one of the military areas to a WRA camp, and of his
indefinite incarceration there. The second count was that on May 9,
1942, he had violated a curfew order, by failing to remain at home after
8 P.m., within a designated military area, in contravention of a regula-
tion promulgated by the military authority. The Court considered the
violation of the second count first, upheld the curfew order and the
sentence imposed for violating it. Since the two sentences were con-
current, it said, there was no need to consider the conviction on the
first count.
In fact, of course, the Court was entirely free to consider the first
count if it wanted to. It would have been normal practice to do so.
Its refusal to pass on the more serious controversy cannot be put down
to wise and forbearing judicial statesmanship. This was not the occa-
sion for prudent withdrawal on the part of the Supreme Court, but for
affirmative leadership in causes peculiarly within its sphere of primary
responsibility. The social problems created by the exclusion and con-
finement of the Japanese Americans of the West Coast states increased
in seriousness with every day of their continued exclusion. The rabble-
rousers of California now were demanding the permanent exclusion of
all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast area. They were
living at peace, altogether free of the threat of Japanese invasion. Yet
they were still successful in their efforts to keep the Japanese out. The
business and professional capital of the Japanese was being profitably
used by others. Intelligent and resourceful competitors had been re-
moved, from many markets. At the expense of the Japanese, vested
interests wdre being created, entrenched, and endowed with political
power. All these interests would resist the return of the Japanese by
law if possible, if not, by terror. The refusal of the Supreme Court to
face the problem was itself a positive decision on the merits. It gave
strength to the anti-Oriental forces on the West Coast, and made a
difficult social situation more and more tense. A full assertion of the
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ordinary rights of citizenship would have shamed and weakened the
lynch spirit. It would have fortified the party of law and order. In-
stead, that party was confused and weakened by the vacillation of the
Court.
41
The reasoning of the Court itself contributed to the intensification of
social pressure.
In the Hirabayashi case the Court held that its problem was the
scope of the war power of the national government. The extent of
Presidential discretion was not presented as a separate issue, because
the statute of March 21, 1942, and appropriation acts under it, were
passed with full knowledge of the action taken and proposed by Gen-
eral DeWitt, and thus fully authorized the curfew. Both Congress and
the Executive were held to have approved the curfew as a wNar measure,
required in their judgment because espionage and sabotage were espe-
cially to be feared from persons of Japanese origin or descent on the
West Coast during the spring of 1942.
The premise from which the Court's argument proceeded was the
incontestable proposition that the war power is the power to wage
war successfully. The State must have every facility and the widest
latitude in defending itself against destruction. The issue for the
Court, the Chief Justice said, was whether at the time "there was any
substantial basis for the conclusion" that the curfew as applied to a
citizen of Japanese ancestry was "a protective measure necessary to
meet the threat of sabotage and espionage which would substantially
affect the war effort and which might reasonably be expected to aid a
threatened enemy invasion." 42 The formulation of the test followed
the lines of the Court's familiar doctrine in passing on the action of
administrative bodies: was there "reasonable ground" for those charged
with the responsibility of national defense to believe that the threat
was real, and the remedy useful? The orders of the commander, the
Court held, were based on findings of fact which supported action
within the contemplation of the statute. The findings were based on an
informed appraisal of the relevant facts in the light of the statutory
standard, and published as proclamations. The circumstances, the
Court said, afforded a sufficiently rational basis for the decision made.
The "facts" which were thus held to "afford a rational basis for
decision" were that in time of war "residents having ethnic affiliations
with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those
of different ancestry," and that in time of war such persons could not
readily be isolated and dealt with individually. 43 This is the basic
factual hypothesis on which all three cases rest.
The first part of this double-headed proposition of fact is contrary
41. See materials cited supra note 34.
42. 320 U. S. 81, 95 (1943).
43. Id. at 101-2.
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.to the experience of American society, in war and peace." Imagine
applying an ethnic presumption of disloyalty in the circumstances of
the Revolution or the Civil War! In the World War and in the present
war, soldiers who had ethnic affiliations with the enemy-German,
Austrian, Hungarian, Finnish, Roumanian, Bulgarian, Japanese and
Italian-fought uniformly as Americans in our armed forces, without
any suggestion of group disloyalty. As a generalization about the
consequences of inheritance, as compared with experience, in determin-
ing political opinions, the Supreme Court's doctrine of ethnic dis-
loyalty belongs with folk proverbs-"blood is thicker than water"-
and the pseudo-genetics of the Nazis. It is flatly contradicted by the
evidence of the biological sciences, of cultural anthropology, sociology,
and every other branch of systematic social study, both in general,
and with specific reference to the position of Japanese groups on the
West Coast. The most important driving urge of such minority groups
is to conform, not to rebel. This is true even for the American minori-
ties which are partially isolated from the rest of society by the bar of
color.45 The desire to conform is stronger than resentments and
counter-reactions to prejudice and discrimination. Insecure and
conscious of the environment as a threat, such minorities seek to
establish their status by proving themselves to be good Americans,
The younger generation rejects the language, customs and attitudes
of the older. The exemplary combat records of the Jipanese American
regiments in Italy and in France is a normal symbol of their quest for
security within the environment. It is an expected part of the process
of social adjustment, repeated again and again in our experience with
minorities within American society. By and large, men and women
who grow up in the American cultural community are Americans in
outlook, values and basic social attitudes. This is the conclusion of the
scientific literature on the subject. It has been the first tenet of Amer-
ican law, the ideal if not always the practice of American life.
To support its contrary opinion, the Supreme Court undertook a
44. Compare the opinion of Mr. Justice Black, for a unanimous Court, in Ex parto
Kumezo Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 73 (1942).
45. See infra, pp. 520-3 and materials cited supra notes 1 and 14; Wirth, The Problem
of Minority Groups in LINTON (ed.), THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD CIsis (1945)
347; MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DnEMA (1944) cc. 3, 33-9, app. 10; SHERMAN, BASIC PROB-
LEMS OF BEHAVIOR (1941) 289-91; MEAD, AND KEEP YOUR POWN.R DRY (1942) cc. 3, 46;
WARNER AND SROLE, THE SocrAL SYSTEMS OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GRouPs (1945) 283-4;
BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1934) especially cc. 1-3, 7, 8; BENEDICT, RACE: SCIENCE
AND POLITICs (1940); LOCKE AND STERN (eds.), WHEN PEOPLES MrEET (1942) cc. 7-12;
MIYAMOTO, SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AMONG THE JAPANESE IN SEATTLE (1939); DOLLARD, CASTE
AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TowN (1937), cc. 12-6; TEOMPSON (ed.), RACE RELATIONS AND
THE RACE PROBLEM (1939); STONEQUIST, THE MARGINAL MAN, A STUDY IN PERSONALITY
AND CULTURE CONFLICT (1937), cc. 3-4, particularly pp. 101-6; Cox, Race and Caste: A
Distinction (1945) 50 Am. J. Soc. 360, 365-6; MACIVER (ed.), GROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP
ANTAGONISMS (1944) pt. 1.
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review of its own intuitions, without a judicial record before it, and
without serious recourse to available scientific studies of the problem.
Kiplingesque folklore about East and West is close to the heart of the
opinions. The Japanese, the Court said, had been imperfectly assimi-
lated; they constituted an isolated group in the community; their
Japanese language schools might be sources of Japanese propaganda.
Moreover, the discriminatory way in which the Japanese on the lVest
Coast were treated may have been regarded as contributing to Jap-
anese solidarity, preventing their assimilation, and increasing in many
instances their attachments to Japan and its institutions.4
There was no testimony or other evidence in the record as to the
facts which governed the judgment of the military in entering the
orders in question. They were not required to support the action they
had taken by producing evidence as to the need for it. Nor were they
exposed to cross-examination. By way of judicial research and notice
the Court wrote four short paragraphs to explain "some of the many
considerations" which in its riew might have been considered by the
military in making their decision to institute a discriminatory curfew. 47
The second part of the Court's basic premise of fact was that it was
impossible to investigate the question of loyalty individually. As to
the validity of this proposition there was neither evidence in the record
nor even discussion by the Court to indicate a basis for the conclusion
which might appeal to a reasonable man, or even to a choleric and
harassed general, faced with the danger of invasion and the specter of
his own court martial. The issue was dismissed in a sentence. "We
cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not
have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not
readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace
to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and
adequate measures be taken to guard against it." 1 In view of the
history of security measures during the war, it would not have been
easy to establish strong grounds for such a belief. There were about
110,000 persons subject to the exclusion orders, 43% of them being
over 50 or under 15.11 At the time of the exclusion orders, they had
lived in California without committing sabotage for five months after
Pearl Harbor. The number of persons to be examined was not beyond
the capacities of individual examination processes, in the light of
experience with such security measures, both in the United States and
abroad.A0 The fact was that the loyalty examinations finally under-
46. 320 U. S. 81, 98 (1943). See infra, pp. 520-3. Such fears arising from centiments of
guilt are of special interest to the student of social psychology.
47. Id. at 99.
48. Ibid.
49. DENVn-r FixAL REPORT, at 403-4.
50. See supra, pp. 494-5.
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taken in the Relocation Authority camps consisted in large part of
filling out a questionnaire, and little more, except in cases of serious
doubt as to loyalty. Most of those released from the camps were given
their freedom on the basis of little information which was not available
on the West Coast in 1942. '
Actually, the exclusion program was undertaken not because the
Japanese were too numerous to be examined individually, but because
they were a small enough group to be punished by confinement. It
would have- been physically impossible to confine the Japanese and
Japanese Americans in Hawaii, and it would have been both physi-
cally and politically impossible to undertake comparable measures
against the 690,000 Italians or the 314,000 Germans living in the
United States. The Japanese were being attacked because for some
they provided the only possible outlet and expression for sentiments of
group hostility. Others were unable or unwilling to accept the burden
of urging the repudiation of'a general's judgment which he placed on
grounds of military need.
The Hirabayaski case states a rule which permits some judicial con-
trol over action purporting to be taken under military authority. It
proposes that such action be treated in the courts like that of adminis-
trative agencies generally, and upheld if supported by "facts" which
afford "a rational basis" for the decision. For all practical purposes,
it is true, the Hirabayashi case ignores the rule; but the Court did go to
great lengths to assert the principle of protecting society against un-
warranted and dictatorial military action. Korematsu v. United States
seems sharply to relax even the formal requirement of judicial review
over military conduct. Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese
descent, was convicted under the Act of March 21, 1942 for violating
an order requiring his exclusion from the coastal area. The Court held
the problem of exclusion to be identical with the issue of discriminatory
curfew presented in the Hirabayashi case. There, it said, the Court had
decided that it was not unreasonable for the military to impose a curfew
in order to guard against the special dangers of sabotage and espionage
anticipated from the Japanese group. The military had found, and the
Court refused to reject the finding, that it was impossible to bring
about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal. Ac-
cording to Mr. Justice Black, the exclusion orders merely apply these
two findings-that the Japanese are a dangerous lot, and that there was
no time to screen them individually. Actually, there was a new "find-
ing" of fact in this case, going far beyond the situation considered in
the Hirabayashi case. The military had "found" that the curfew pro-
vided inadequate protection against the danger of sabotage and
espionage. Therefore the exclusion of all Japanese, citizens and aliens
51. See note 31 supra.
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alike, was thought to be a reasonable way to protect the Coast against
sabotage and espionage. Mr. Justice Black does not pretend to review
even the possible foundations of such a judgment. There is no attempt
in the Korematsu case to show a reasonable connection between the
factual situation and the program adopted to deal with it.
The Court refused to regard the validity of the detention features
of the relocation policy as raised by the case. Korematsu had not yet
been taken to a camp, and the Court would not pass on the issues pre-
sented by such imprisonment. Those issues, the Court said, are "mo-
mentous questions not contained within the framework of the pleadings
or the evidence in this case. It will be time enough to decide the serious
constitutional issues which petitioner seeks to raise when an assembly
or relocation order is applied or is certain to be applied to him, and we
have its terms before us." 52 This is a good deal like saying in an ordi-
nary criminal case that the appeal raises th validity of the trial and
verdict, but not the sentence, since the defendant may be out on proba-
tion or bail. It is difficult to understand in any event why this con-
sideration did not apply equally to the evidence before the Court on
the issue which the Court conceded was raised by the pleadings, i.e.,
the decision of the General to exclude all Japanese from the Defense
Area. On this problem there was literally no trial record or other form
of evidence in the case.
There were four other opinions in Korenzatsu v. United States. Mr.
Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Murphy dissented on the merits, in
separate opinions. Mr. Justice Roberts said that while he might agree
that a temporary or emergency exclusion of the Japanese was a legiti-
mate exercise of military power, this case presented a plan for imprison-
ing the Japanese in concentration camps, solely because of their an-
cestry, and "without evidence or inquiry" as to their "loyalty and
good disposition towards the United States.",53 Such action, he said,
was clearly unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice Murphy's substantial opinion does not join issue with
the opinion of the Court on the central problem of how to review mili-
tary decisions, but it does contend that the military decisions involved
in this case were unjustified in fact. The military power, he agreed,
must have wide and appropriate discretion in carrying out military
duties. But, "like other claims conflicting with the asserted constitu-
tional rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself
to the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its
conflicts with other interests reconciled. ...
"The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of mili-
tary necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of his con-
52. 323 U.S. 214, 222 (1944).
53. Id. at 226.
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stitutional rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably related
to a public danger that is so 'immediate, imminent, and impending'
as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of ordi-
nary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger. . . Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34, banishing from a prescribed area of the
Pacific Coast 'all persons of Jdpanese ancestry, both alien and non-
alien,' clearly does not meet that test. Being an obvious racial dis-
crimination, the order deprives all those within its scope of' the
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment. It further deprives these individuals of their constitutional
rights to live and work where they will, to establish a home where
they choose and to move about freely. In excommunicating, them
without benefit of hearings, this order also deprives them of all their
constitutional rights to procedural due process. Yet no reasonable
relation to an 'immediate, imminent, and impending' public
danger is evident to support this racial restriction which is one of
the most sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional
rights in the history of this nation in the absence of martial law." 14
The action taken does not meet such a test, Justice Murphy argues,
because there was no reasonable ground for supposing that all persons
of Japanese blood have a tendency to commit sabotage or espionage,
nor was there any ground for supp6sing that their loyalty could not
have been tested individually where they lived. A review of statements
made by General DeWitt before Congressional committees and in his
Final Report to the Secretary of War clearly reveals that the basis of
his action was "an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-
truths and insinuations that for years have been directed against
Japanese Americans by people with racial and economic prejudices." 11
These are compared with the independent studies of experts, and shown
to be nonsensical. The supposed basis for the exercise of military dis-
cretion disappears, and the case for the order falls.
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a fascinating and fantastic essay in
nihilism. Nothing in the record of the case, he said very properly,
permits the Court to judge the military reasonableness of the order.
But even if the orders were permissible and reasonable as military
measures, he said, "I deny that it follows that they are constitu-
tional." 56
"I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an
order which violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reason-
able exercise of military authority. The courts can exercise only
the judicial power, can apply only law, and must abide by the
Constitution, br they cease to be civil courts and become instru-
ments of military policy.
54. Id. at 234-5.
55. Id. at 239. See discussion infra, pp. 520-3.
56. Id. at 245.
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"Of course the existence of a military power resting on force, so
vagrant, so centralized, so necessarily heedless of the individual,
is an inherent threat to liberty. But I would not lead people to
rely on this Court for a review that seems to me wholly delusive.
The military reasonableness of these orders can only be determined
by military superiors. If the people ever let command of the war
power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts
wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon
those who command the physical forces of the country, in the
future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political
judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of
history.
"My duties as a justice as I see them do not require me to make a
military judgment as to whether General DeWitt's evacuation and
detention program was a reasonable military necessity. I do not
suggest that the courts should have attempted to interfere with the
Army in carrying out its task. But I do not think that they may be
asked to execute a military expedient that has no place in law
under the Constitution. I would reverse the judgment and dis-
charge the prisoner." 57
Thus the Justice proposes to refuse enforcement of the statute of
March 21, 1942. Apparently, in this regard at least, the statute would
be treated as unconstitutional. The prisoner would then be taken to
the camp and kept there by the military, and all judicial relief would
be denied him.
It is hard to imagine what courts are for if not to protect people
against unconstitutional arrest. If the Supreme Court washed its
hands of such problems, for what purposes would it sit? The idea that
military officers whose only authority rests on that of the President
and the Congress, both creatures of the Constitution, can be con-
sidered to be acting "unconstitutionally" when they carry out con-
cededly legitimate military policies is Pickw ickian, to say the least.
For judges to pass by on the other side, when men are imprisoned with-
out charge or trial, suggests a less appealing analogy. The action of
Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman is in a more heroic tradition
of the judge's responsibility."'
What Justice Jackson is saying seems to be this: Courts should refuse
to decide hard cases, for in the hands of foolish judges they make bad
law. The ark of the law must be protected against contamination.
Therefore law should not be allowed to grow through its application
to the serious and intensely difficult problems of modem life, such as
the punishment of war criminals or the imprisonment of Japanese
57. Id. at 247-S.
58. Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9487 (D. Md. 1861). S-.e Srisr ,
ROGER B. TANEY (1935) c. 26.
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Americans. It should be kept in orderly seclusion, and confined to
problems like the logical adumbration of the full faith and credit
clause, and other lawyers' issues.'9 The problems which deeply con-
cern us should be decided outside the courts, even when they arise as
the-principal and inescapable issues of law suits. Judges are thus to
be relieved of the political responsibilities of their citizenship and their
office. They will be allowed to pretend that the'judicial function is to
"interpret" the law, and that law itself is a technical and antiquarian
hobby, not the central institution of a changing society.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred specially, answering Mr. Justice
Jackson's dissent. "To talk about a military order that expresses an
allowable judgment of war needs by those entrusted with the duty of
conducting war as 'an unconstitutional order' is to suffuse a part of the
Constitution with an atmosphere of unconstitutionality," he said.,'
But one of the first issues of the case was whether or not the military
order in question did express an "allowable 'judgment of war needs."
That was the question which the Court was compelled to decide, and
did decide, without benefit of the testimony of witnesses, or a factual
record, and without substantial independent study on its own motion.
Ex parte Endo was the next stage in the judicial elucidation of the
problem.6' In Ex parte Endo, decided on December 18, 1944, an ad-
judication was finally obtained on about one half the question of the
validity of confining Japanese aliens and citizens in camps. The case
was a habeas corpus proceeding in which an American citizen of Jap-
anese ancestry sought freedom from a War Relocation Center where
she was detained, after having been found loyal, until the Authority
could place her in an area of the country where local disorder would
not be anticipated as a result of her arrival. The Court held that the
statute, as rather strenuously construed, did not authorize the deten-
tion of persons in the petitioner's situation, although temporary deten-
tion for the purpose of investigating loyalty was assumed to be valid
as an incident to the program of "orderly" evacuation approved in
the Korematsu case.
The purpose of the statute under which exclusion and detention were
accomplished, the Court said, was to help prevent sabotage and es-
pionage. The act talks only of excluding persons from defense areas.
It does not mention the possibility of their detention. While the Court
assumes that an implied power of temporary detention may be ac-
59. See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of The Constitution (1945)
45 COL. L. REv. 1. See also Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States,
65 Sup. Ct. 690, 700-2 (U. S. 1945); Jackson, The Rule of'Law Among Nations (1945) 31
A. B. A. J. 290, 292-3. Compare his report to the President on trials for war criminals,
N. Y. Times, June 8, 1945, p. 4 .
60. 323 U. S. 214,224-5 (1944).
61. 323 U. S. 283 (1944).
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cepted, as an incident in the program of exclusion, for the purpose of
facilitating loyalty examinations, such an implied power should be
narrowly confined to the precise purpose of the statute, in order to
minimize the impact of the statute on the liberties of the individual
citizen. The authority to detain a citizen as a measure of protection
against sabotage and espionage is exhausted when his loyalty is estab-
lished. The persistence of community hostility to citizens of Japanese
descent is not a ground for holding them in camp under the present
statute. The disclosure of the full scope of the detention program to
various committees of the Congress, including appropriation com-
mittees, was held not to support a ratification by the Congress of what
was done. The basis of this conclusion was the extraordinarily technical
proposition that the appropriation acts which might have been con-
sidered to ratify the entire program were lump-sum appropriations, and
were not broken down by items to earmark a specific sum for the
specific cost of detaining citizens found to be loyal pending their reloca-
tion in friendly communities. In this respect the reasoning of the Court
is contrary to that in the Hirabayashi case, where Congressional ratifi-
cation of the plans of the executive branch -as established in a broad
and common-sense way. Justices Roberts and Murphy concurred
specially, urging that the decision be based on the constitutional
grounds stated in their opinions in the Korenzatsu case, rather than on
the statutory interpretation underlying Justice Douglas' opinion.
IV
The many opinions of the three Japanese cases do not consider the
primary constitutional issues which are raised by the Vest Coast anti-
Japanese program as a whole. This was a program which included
(a) a discriminatory curfew against Japanese persons; (b) their exclu-
sion from the West Coast; (c) their confinement pending investigations
of loyalty; and (d) the indefinite confinement of those persons found to
be disloyal. These measures were proposed and accepted as military
necessities. Their validity as military measures was an issue in litiga-
tion. By what standards are courts to pass on the justification for such
military action? 'Were those standards satisfied here?
The conception of the war power under the American Constitution
rests on the ex-perience of the Revolution and the Civil War. It rests
on basic political principles which men who had endured those times of
trouble had fully discussed and carefully articulated. The chief archi-
tects of the conception were men of affairs who had participated in
war, and had definite and sophisticated ideas about the role of the
professional military mind in the conduct of war.
The first and dominating proposition about the war power under
the Constitution is that the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces
is a civilian and must be a civilian, elected and not promoted to his
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office. The subordination of the military to the civil power is thus
primarily assured. In every democracy the relationship between civil
and military power is the crucial social and political issue on which its
capacity to survive a crisis ultimately depends. Inadequate analysis
of this problem, and inadequate measures to deal with it, led to the
downfall of the Spanish Republic, and gravely weakened the Third
French Republic. British experience, especially during the first World
War, puts the problem in dramatic perspective.62 In its own proper
sphere of tactics, the professional military judgment is decisive. In
waging war the larger decisions-the choice of generals, the organiza-
tion of command, the allocation of forces, the political, economic and
often strategic aspects of war-these have to be made by responsible
civilian ministers.6" Clemenceau's famous remark, quoted at the head
of this article, is not a witticism, but the first principle of organizing
democracy for war. It reflects a balanced view of the proper relation in
policy-making between the expert and the prhctical man. It expresses
a keen sense of the supremacy of civil power in a republic. The image
of Napoleon is never far from the surface of French political con-
sciousness. France's experience with P6tain has once more underscored
the danger. In our own national life recurring waste and incompetence
in the handling of war problems-in the Mexican War, the Civil War,
and the Spanish-American, War-led to important reforms in the
organization of the War Department under Elihu Root, and further
developments under later Secretaries of War.64 The process of achiev-
ing adequate organization and control is by no means complete.
The second political principle governing the exercise of the war
power in a democracy is that of responsibility. Like every other officer
of government, soldiers must answer for their decisions to the system
of law, and not to the Chief of Staff alone. Where, as in the Japanese
exclusion program, military decisions lead to conflicts between in-
dividuals and authority, the courts must adjudicate them. Even if
Mr. Justice Jackson's doctrine of the judicial function is accepted, the
courts will adjudicate nonetheless, by refusing relief, and thus decide
62. See WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE (1933-1937), Vol. 6, c. 10 (Some Re-
flections on the Functions of Governments and Soldiers Respectively in a War); vol. 1, cc. 5, 6,
9, 10, 14, 15; vol. 2, cc. 8-10, 17-9; vol. 3, cc. 3-6, 9-11; vol. 4, cc. 9-11, 13; vol. 5, cc. 6, 8;
CHURCHILL, THE WORLD CRISIS (1931) cc. 4, 19, 38, pp. 733-45; WILKINSON, WAR AND
POLICY (1910) 259-300; WRIGHT, AT THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL (1921); Rogers, Civilian
Control of Military Policy (1940) 18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 280.
63. See PALMER, WASHINGTON, LINCOLN, WILSON, THREE WAR STATESMEN (1930)
224-.7, 282-3; PALMER, AMERICA IN ARMS (1941) 145-6; De Weerd, Civilian and Military
Elements in Modern War in CLAREKSON AND COCHRAN, WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION (1941)
95. See also MCKINLEY, DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER (2d ed. 1941); VAGTS, A His-
TORY OF MILITARISM (1937).
64. See 1 JESSUP, ELiHU ROOT (1938) 240-64; ROOT, TE MILITARY AND COLONIAL
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1916); Rogers, op. cit. supra, note 62, at 288-91.
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cases in favor of the military power. The problem is the scope of the
military power, and means for assuring its responsible exercise. It is
not a problem which can be avoided by any verbal formula.
Most occasions for the exercise of authority in the name of military
need will not present justiciable controversy. When a general attacks
or retreats in the field, sends his troops to the right or to the left, he
may have to justify his decision to a court martial, but not often to a
court. On the other hand some steps deemed to be required in war do
raise the kind of conflict over property or personal rights which can be
presented to the courts. A factory or business may be taken into
custody, prices and wages may be established, whole classes of activity,
like horse-racing, temporarily forbidden. Without stopping for an over-
nice definition of the terms, these are justiciable occasions--situations
in which courts have customarily decided controversies, and determined
the legality of official action when such problems were implicit in the
conflicts presented to them. 5 It is essential to every democratic value
in society that official action taken in the name of the war power be
held to standards of responsibility under such circumstances. The
courts have not in the past, and should not now, declare the whole
category of problems to be political questions beyond the reach of
judicial review. The pretent Supreme Court is dominated by the
conviction that in the past judicial review has unduly limited the
freedom of administrative action. But surely the permissible response
to bad law is good law, not no law at all. The Court must review the
exercise of military power in a way which permits ample freedom to the
Executive, yet assures society as a whole that appropriate standards
of responsibility have been met.
The issue for judicial decision in these cases is not lessened or changed
by saying that the war power includes any steps required to ,in the
war. The problem is still one of judgment as to what helps win a war.
Who is to decide whether there was a sensible reason for doing what was
done? Is it enough for the General to say that at the time he acted, he
honestly thought it was a good idea to do what he did? Is this an exam-
ple of "expertise," to which the courts must give blind deference?" Or
must there be "objective" evidence, beyond the General's state of
mind, to show "the reasonable ground for belief" which the Hirabayaski
65. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S.
503 (1944); Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Yahus v.
United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United States, C. C. A.
7th, June 8, 1945.
66. Railroad Commission of Te-xas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940),
mod., 311 U. S. 614 (1941); Railroad Commission -,. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S.
570 (1941). Cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U. S. 55 (1937): Note (1942) 51
YALE L. J. 680.
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case says is necessary? 67 Should such evidence be available before the
action is taken? Should the rule be a procedural one that the general
has to consider evidence, and then come to a decision, or should it be
only that at the subsequent trial suitable evidence is available to justify
the result? As the Chief Justice remarked, the Constitution "does not
demand the impossible or the impractical." 68 The inquiry should be
addressed to the rationality of the general's exercise of his judgment
as a general, not as a master in chancery. It should give full and
sympathetic weight to the confusion and danger which are inevitable
elements in any problem presented for military decision.
Unless the courts require a showing, in cases like these, of an in-
telligible relationship between means and ends, society has lost its
basic protection against the abuse of military power. The general's
good intentions must be irrelevant. There should be evidence in court
that his military judgment had a suitable basis in fact. As Colonel
Fairman, a strong proponent of widened military discretion, points out:
"When the executive fails or is unable to satisfy the court of the evident
necessity for the extraordinary measures it has taken, it can hardly
expect the court to assume it on faith." 69
The Hirabayashi case proposes one test for the validity of an exer-
cise of military power. Even though that test is not applied in the
Hirabayashi case, and is roughly handled in the Korematsu case, it is
not hopelessly lost. As the Court said in Sterling v. Constantin, the
necessity under all the circumstances for a use of martial power "is
necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding di-
rected against the individuals charged with the transgression.""
Perhaps the closest judicial precedent and analogy for the Japanese
American cases is Mitchell v. Harmony, which arose out of the Doniphan
raid during the Mexican war. The plaintiff was a trader, whose wagons,
mules, and goods were seized by, the defendant, a lieutenant colonel of
67. See note 17 supra. For recent treatments of administrative and executive findings
by various justices of the Supreme Court in cognate, if not directly comparable situations,
see Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943); ICC v. Inland Waterways, 319
U. S. 671 (1943); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944); Connecticut Light &
Power Co. v. FPC, 65 Sup. Ct. 749 (U. S. 1945); Bridges v. Wixon, 65 Sup. Ct. 1443 (U. S.
1945).
68. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943).
69. FAImAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (2d ed. 1943) 217-8. See also id. at 47-9,
103-7; Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency (1942) 55 HARM. L.
REv. 1253, 1259-61, 1272. The test is put by WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL
LAw (1940) 26-7, for "the hapless Guardsman who commands the troops," as "What can
you justify afterwards?". See Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 879. The statute of March 21,
1942 should be interpreted to pose the same issue, despite its broad language.
70. 287 U. S. 378, 398 (1932). Id. at 401: "What are the allowable limits of military
discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial
questions." Certain cases, though technically distinguishable, seem to proceed from differ-
ent hypotheses. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19 (U. S. 1827); The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635
(U. S. 1862); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 (1909).
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the United States Army, during the course of the expedition. The
plaintiff, who wanted to leave the Army column and trade with the
Mexicans, was forced to accompany the troops. All his property was
lost on the march and in battle. The action wvas of trespass, for the
value of the property taken, and for damages. The defenses were that
the control of the trader and the destruction of his property were a
military necessity, justified by the circumstances of the situation.
After a full trial, featured by depositions of the commanding officers,
the jury found for the plaintiff.
"The defence has been placed . . .on rumors which reached the
commanding officer and suspicions which he appears to have enter-
tained of a secret design in the plaintiff to leave the American
forces and carry on an illicit trade with the enemy, injurious to the
interests of the United States. And if such a design had been shown,
and that he was preparing to leave the American troops for that
purpose, the seizure and detention of his property, to prevent its
execution, would have been fully justified. But there is no evidence
in the record tending to show that these rumors and suspicions had
any foundation. And certainly mere suspicions of an illegal inten-
tion will not authorize a military officer to seize and detain the
property of an American citizen. The fact that such an intention
existed must be shown; and of that there is no evidence.
"The 2d and 3d objections will be considered together, as they
depend on the same principles. Upon these two grounds of defence
the Circuit Court instructed the jury, that the defendant might
lawfully take possession of the goods of the plaintiff, to prevent
them from falling into the hands of the public enemy; but in order
to justify the seizure the danger must be immediate and impending,
and not remote or contingent. And that he might also take them
for public use and impress them into the public service, in case of
an immediate and pressing danger or urgent necessity existing at
the time, but not otherwise.
"In the argument of these two points, the circumstances under
which the goods of the plaintiff were taken have been much dis-
cussed, and the evidence examined for the purpose of showing the
nature and character of the danger which actually existed at the
time or was apprehended by the commander of the American forces.
But this question is not before us. It is a question of fact upon
which the jury have passed, and their verdict has decided that a
danger or necessity, such as the court described, did not exist when
the property of the plaintiff was taken by the defendant. And the
only subject for inquiry in this court is whether the law was cor-
rectly stated in the instruction of the court; and whether any thing
short of an immediate and impending danger from the public
enemy, or an urgent necessity for the public service, can justify the
taking of private property by a military commander to prevent
it from falling into the hands of the enemy or for the purpose of
converting it to the use of the public.
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"The instruction is objected to on the ground, that it restricts the
power of the officer within narrower limits than the law will justify.
And that when the troops are employed in an expedition into the
enemy's country, where the dangers that meet them cannot always
be foreseen, and where they are cut off from aid from their own gov-
ernment, the commanding officer must necessarily be intrusted with
some discretionary power as to the measures he should adopt; and
if he acts honestly, and to the best of his judgment, the law will
protect him. But it must be remembered that the question here,
is not as to the discretion he may exercise in his military operations
or in relation to those who are under his command. His distance
from home, and the duties in which he is engaged, cannot enlarge
his power over the property of a citizen, nor give to him, in that
respect, any authority which he would not, under similar circum-
stances, possess at home. And where the owner has done nothing
to forfeit his rights, every public officer is bound to respect them,
whether he finds the property in a foreign or hostile country, or in
his own.
"There are, without doubt, occasions in which private property
may lawfully be taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from
falling into the hands of the public enemy; and also where a military
officer, charged with a particular duty, may impress private prop-
erty into the public service or take it for public use. Uncjuestion-
ably, in such cases, the government is bound to make full compensa-
tion to the owner; but the officer is not a trespasser.
"But we are clearly of opinion, that in all of these cases the dan-
ger must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for
the public service, such as will not admit of delay, and where the
action of the civil authority would be too late in providing the
means which the occasion calls for. It is impossible to define the
particular circumstances of danger or necessity in which this
power may be lawfully exercised. Every case must depend on its
own circumstances. It is the emergency that gives the right, and
the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be
justified.
"In deciding upon this necessity, however, the state of the facts,
as they appeared to the officer at the time he acted, must govern
the decision; for he must necessarily act upon the information of
others as well as his own observation. And if, with such informa-
tion as he had a right to rely upon, there is reasonable ground for
believing that the peril is immediate and menacing, or the necessity
urgent, he is justified in acting upon it; and the discovery after-
wards that it was false or erroneous, will not make him a trespasser.
But it is not sufficient to show that he exercised an honest judg-
.ment, and took the property to promote the public service; he must
show by proof the nature and character of the emergency, such as
he had reasonable grounds to believe it to be, and it is then for a
jury to say, whether it was so pressing as not to admit of delay; and
the occasion such, according to the information upon which he
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acted, that private rights must for the time give way to the com-
mon and public good.
"But it is not alleged that Colonel Doniphan xwas deceived by
false intelligence as to the movements or strength of the enemy at
the time the property was taken. His camp at San Elisario was
not threatened. He was well informed upon the state of affairs in
his rear, as well as of the dangers before him. And the property was
seized, not to defend his position, nor to place his troops in a safer
one, nor to anticipate the attack of an approaching enemy, but to
insure the success of a distant and hazardous expedition, upon
which he was about to march.
"The movement upon Chihuahua was undoubtedly undertaken
from high and patriotic motives. It was boldly planned and gal-
lantly executed, and contributed to the successful issue of the war.
But it is not for the court to say what protection or indemnity is
due from the public to an officer who, in his zeal for the honor and
interest of his country, and in the excitement of military operations,
has trespassed on private rights. That question belongs to the polit-
ical department of the government. Our duty is to determine
under what circumstances private property may be taken from
the owner by a military officer in a time of war. And the question
here is, whether the law permits it to be taken to insure the success
of any enterprise against a public enemy which the commanding
officer may deem it advisable to undertake. And we think it very
clear that the law does not permit it." 71
Applied to the circumstances of the Japanese exclusion cases, these
precedents require that there be a showing to the trial court of the
evidence upon which General DeWitt acted, or evidence which justi-
fies his action under the statute and the constitution. Nor vill it do to
say that there need be only enough evidence to prove his good faith,
or to provide a possible basis for the decision. This was the contention
expressly overruled in M1itchell v. Harwny.72 The varying formulae
about presumptions, and the quantum of proof required in different
classes of cases, merely conceal the court's problem. There must be
evidence enough to satisfy the court as to the need for the grave and
disagreeable action taken-arrest on vague suspicion, denial of trial,
and permanent incarceration for opinions alone. The standard of
reasonableness, here as elsewhere, is one requiring a full evaluation of
all circumstances. But the law is not neutral. It has a positive prefer-
ence for protecting civil rights where possible, and a long-standing
suspicion of the military mind when acting outside its own sphere. In
protecting important social values against frivolous or unnecessary
interference by generals, the courts' obligations cannot be satisfied by
a scintilla of evidence, or any other mechanical rule supposed to ex-
71. Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 133-5 (U. S. 1851).
72. Id. at 119-20.
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plain the process of proof. There must be a convincing and substantial
factual case, in Colonel Fairman's phrase, to satisfy the court of "the
evident necessity" for the measures taken.
No matter how narrowly the rule of proof is formulated, it could not
have been satisfied in either the Hirabayashi or the Korematsu cases.
Not only was there insufficient evidence in those cases to satisfy a
reasonably prudent judge or a reasonably prudent general: there was
no evidence whatever by which a court might test the responsibility
of General DeWitt's action, either under the statute of March 21, 1942,
or on more general considerations, True, in the Hirabayasli case the
Court carefully identified certain of General DeWitt's proclamations as
"findings," which established the conformity of his actions to the
standard of the statute-the protection of military resources against
the risk of sabotage and espionage. But the military proclamations
record conclusions, not evidence. And in both cases the record is bare
of testimony on either side about the policy of the curfew or the exclu-
sion orders. There was every reason to have regarded this omission as a
fatal defect, and to have remanded in each case for a trial on the jus-
tification of the discriminatory curfew, and of the exclusion orders.
Such an inquiry would have been illuminating. General DeWitt's
Final Report and his testimony before committees of the Congress
clearly indicate that his motivation was ignorant race prejudice, not
facts to support the hypothesis that there was a greater risk of sabotage
among the Japanese than among residents of German, Italian, or any
other ethnic affiliation. The most significant comment on the quality
of the General's report is contained in the Government's brief in
Korematsu v. United States. There the Solicitor General said that the
report was relied upon "for statistics and other details concerning the
actual evacuation and the events that took place subsequent thereto.
We have specifically recited in this brief the facts relating to the jus-
tification for the evacuation, of which we ask the Court to take judicial
notice, and we rely upon the Final Report only to the extent that it
relates such facts." 11 Yet the Final Report embodies the basic decision
under review, and states the reasons why it was actually undertaken.
General DeWitt's Final Recommendation to the Secretary of War,
dated February 14, 1942, included in the Final Report, is the closest
approximation we have in these cases to an authoritative determination
of fact. In that Recommendation, General DeWitt says:
"In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not
severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and
73. Brief for United States, p. 11, n. 2, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214
(1944). See Brief for United States, p. 23, Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 322 U. S. 233 (1944). It
was peculiarly inappropriate to decide these cases on the basis of judicial notice alone,
Borden's Farm Products Co.,, Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194 (1934); United States v. Caro-
lene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938); Polk Co. v. Gloser, 305 U. S. 5 (1938). Sce Com-
ment (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rnv. 631.
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while many second and third generation Japanese born on United
States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become
'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted. To conclude
otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents on Jap-
anese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese sub-
jects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war
against the nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with Ger-
many and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any
Japanese, barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though
born and raised in the United States, will not turn against this
nation when the final test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, follows
that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enenies,
of Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications
that these are organized and ready for concerted action at a favora-
ble opportunity. The very fact that no sabotage has taken place
to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action
will be taken." 74
In his Final Report to the Secretary of War General DeWitt adduces
somewhat more evidence than the absence of sabotage to prove its
special danger. His report, and the briefs for the United States in
Hirabayashi v. United States and Korematsza v. United States emphasize
these points as well: The Japanese lived together, often concentrated
around harbors and other strategic areas. They had been discrimi-
nated against, and it was suggested that their resentment at such
treatment might give rise to disloyalty. Japanese clubs and religious
institutions played an important part in their social life. Japanese
language schools were maintained to preserve for the American-born
children something of the cultural heritage of Japan. The Japanese
Government, like that of Italy, France, and many other countries, as-
serted a doctrine of nationality which was thought to result in claims of
dual citizenship, and thus to cast doubt on the loyalty of American
citizens of Japanese descent. There were some 10,000 Kibei among the
population of the West Coast, Japanese Americans who had returned
to Japan for an important part of their education, and who were
thought to be more strongly affiliated with Japan in their political
outlook than the others.
75
74. DEWITTT FiNAL REPORT at 34. See also id. at vii, 7-24. Some of the reaoning uw d
to justify the discriminatory treatment of the Japanese Americans can only be described as
astounding in its terms, and in its refusal to consider or to evaluate available Eociological
data. See, e.g., FAiXmMN, THE L-wv oF MLrTiAL RuLE (2d ed. 1943) 260 ("Fundamental
differences in mores have made them inscrutable to us"); Watson, Tte Japanese Evacuatior.
and Litigation Arising Therefrom (1942) 22 ORE. L. REv. 46, 47 ("Their mental and emo-
tional responses are understood by but few of our people and in general the Japanee pre-
sents an inscrutable personality").
75. See ToLAx CosmnrA= REPORTS (Preliminary) 16. Such persons were of courz. in-
dividually known, through travel records and otherwise.
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Much of the suspicion inferentially based on these statements dis-
appears when they are more closely examined. In many instances the
concentration of Japanese homes around strategic areas had come
about years before, and for entirely innocent reasons. Japanese fishing
and cannery workers, for example, were compelled by the canneries to
live on the waterfront, in order to be near the plants in which they
worked. Japanese truck gardeners rented land in the industrial out-
skirts of large cities in order to be as close as possible to their markets.
They rented land for agricultural purposes under high tension lines-
regarded as a very suspicious circumstance---because the company
could not use the land for other purposes. The initiative in starting
the practice came from the utility companies, not from the Japanese."
Despite discrimination against the Japanese, many had done well in
America. They were substantial property owners. Their children par-
ticipated normally and actively in the schools and universities of the
West Coast. Their unions and social organizations had passed resolu-
tions of loyalty in great number, before and after the Pearl Harbor
disaster. 7 It is difficult to find real evidence that either religious or
social institutions among the Japanese had successfully fostered
Japanese militarism, or other dangerous sentiments, among the Jap-
anese American population. The Japanese language schools, which
the Japanese Americans themselves had long sought to put under state
control, seem to represent little more than the familiar desire of many
immigrant groups to keep alive the language and tradition of the "old
country;" in the case of Japanese Americans, knowledge of the Jap-
anese language was of particular economic importance, since so much
of their working life was spent with other Japanese on the West Coast."
There were of course suspicious elements among the Japanese. They
were known to the authorities, which had for several years been check-
ing the security of the Japanese American population. Many had been
-individually arrested immediately after Pearl Harbor, and the others
were under constant surveillance. We had many intelligence officers
who knew both the language and the people well. So far as the police
were concerned, there was no substance to the man-in-the-street's
belief that all Orientals "look alike." 19 On the contrary, the Japanese
76. See McWILLiAMS, PREjuDicE (1944) 119-21; 29 TOLAN COMMIrEE HEARINGS
11225.
77. See TOLAN ColbirrTEE REPORTS (Preliminary) 15 ("We cannot doubt, and every-
one is agreed, that the majority of Japanese citizens and aliens are loyal to this country");
An Intelligence Officer, The Japanese in America: The Problem and the Solution (1942) 185
HARPER'S 489.
78. See McWILLIAMiS, PREJUDiCE (1944) 121-2.
79. See, e.g., 31 TOLAN COmMITTEE HEARINGS 11631; Denman, J., dissenting, Kore-
matsu v. United States, 140 F. (2d) 289, 302-3 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943). As for the knowledge
of the situation possessed by security officers, see 31 TOLAN CoMITTEE HEARINGS 11697-
702; An Intelligence Officer, loc. cit. supra note 77. A considerable percentage-perhaps
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were a small and conspicuous minority on the West Coast, both in-
dividually and as a group. They would have been an unlikely source
of sabotage agents for an intelligent enemy in any case.
Apart from the members of the group knowm to be under suspicion,
there was no evidence beyond the vaguest fear to connect the Japanese
on the West Coast with the unfavorable military events of 1941 and
1942. Both at Pearl Harbor and in sporadic attacks on the West
Coast the enemy had shown that he had knowledge of our dispositions.
There was some signaling to enemy ships at sea, both by radio and by
lights, along the West Coast. It wras said to be difficult to trace such
signals because of limitations on the power of search without warrant.
There had been several episodes of shelling the coast by submarine,
although two of the three such episodes mentioned by General DeWitt
as tending to create suspicion of the Japanese Americans had taken
place after their removal from the Coast. These were the only such
items in the Final Report which were not identified by date." And it
was positively known that no suspicions attached to the Japanese
residents for sabotage at Pearl Harbor before, during or aftei the raid.81
Those subsequently arrested as Japanese agents were all white men.
"To focus attention on local residents of Japanese descent, actually
diverted attention from those who were busily engaged in espionage
activity." S2
It is possible that the absence of a trial on the facts may permit the
Court in the future to distinguish or to extinguish the Japanese Amer-
ican cases; for in these cases the defendants did not bring forth evi-
dence, nor require the Government to produce evidence, on the factual
justification of the military action. Whoever had the burden of going
forward, or of proof, Government or defendant, the burden was not
met. 3 Not even the Korematsu case would justify the exclusion of such
19%--of the evacuees gave negative answers to the loyalty questions in their questionnaires.
Many of those answers were expressly referred to the treatment the Japaneza had received
in being uprooted and imprisoned. It is estimated that many more of the answers were di-
rectly or indirectly referable to the shock of evacuation and confinement. See Hearings
before Committee on Immigration and N1aturalzation on H. ?. 2701, 3012, 3489, 3446, and
4103, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1944) 36-43. Basically, of cource, the issue is to a considerable
extent irrelevant. Disloyalty is not a crime, even in the aggravated form of enthusiastic
propaganda for the Axis cause. See note 2 supra. At most, it is a povzible ground for in-
terning enemy aliens, see N. Y. Times, June 27, 1945, p. 15, cal. 7, but hardly a sufficient
ground for excluding individuals from strategic areas. See note 13 supra.
80. DWrTr FIrNAL REPORT at 1; N. Y. Times, June 23, 1942, p. 1, cal. 4; p. 9, cal. 4;
id., Sept. 15, 1942, p. 1, col. 3; p. 10, col. S.
81. See McWrILLiAus, PRE uDic (1944) 144.
S2. Id.at111.
83. In applying the doctrine of Mitchdl v. Harmony, the burden of proof in fact falls on
the Government, claiming the privileges of the emergency. WAhatever is Eaid about the pre-
sumption of constitutionality of statutes, or the interest of the court in not substituting its
judgment on the facts for that of the qualified executive or legislative authority, where the
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evidence, nor the denial of a defendant's request to call the General as a
witness. A future case may therefore create a better record for es-
tablishing appropriate criteria of judicial control over military con-
duct, and for applying such criteria to better purpose.
A trial on the factual justification of the curfew and exclusion orders
would require the Court to confront Ex parte Milligan,"4 which it
sought to avoid in all three of the Japanese cases. Ex parte Milligan
represents an application to a large and common class of semi-military
situations of what Chief Justice Stone articulated in the Hirabayashi
case as a "rule of reason" governing the scope of military power. The
military power, the Chief Justice said, included any steps needed to
wage war successfully. The justices in the majority in Ex parte Milli-
gan declared in effect that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
convince them that there was or could be a military necessity for al-
lowing the military to hold, try, or punish civilians while the civil
courts were open and functioning. And it held further that it is for the
judges, not the generals, to say when it is proper under the Constitu-
tion to shut the courts, or to deny access to them.
Ex parte Milligan is a monument in the democratic tradition, and
should be the animating force of this branch of our law. At a time when
national emergency, mobilization and war are more frequent occur-
rences than at any previous period of our history, it would be difficult
to name a single decision of more fundamental importance to society.
Yet there is a tendency to treat Ex parte Milligan as outmoded, as if
new methods of "total" warfare made the case an anachronism." Those
who take this view have forgotten the circumstances of the Civil War.
Fifth columns, propaganda, sabotage and espionage were more gen-
erally used than in any war since the siege of Troy, and certainly more
widely used than in the second World War.
Ex parte Milligan illustrates the point. Milligan was convincingly
charged with active participation in a fifth column plot worthy of
Hitler or Alfred Hitchcock. A group of armed and determined men
were to seize federal arsenals at Columbus, Indianapolis and at three
points in Illinois, and then to release Confederate prisoners of war held
in those states. Thus they would create a Confederate army behind
the Union lines in Tennessee. Milligan and his alleged co-conspirators
justification for extraordinary behavior rests on a showing of extraordinary circumstances,
it will finally be the Government's burden to bring in the evidence of emergency, or take the
risk of not persuading the court. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 13, 72, and 73.
84. 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1867). See Frank, Ex parte Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial
Law in Hawaii, 44 COL. L. REv. 639 (1944); KLAUS, THE MILLIGAN CASE (1929); FAIRMAN,
MR. JUSTICE MILLERAND THE SUPREME COURT (1939) c. 4.
85. Brief for Respondent, pp. 45-8, Ex parle Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942); Ex parle Ven-
tura, 44 F. Supp. 520, 522-3 (W. D. Wash. 1942). For a moderate view see Schueller v.
Drum, 51 F. Supp. 383,387 (E. D. Pa. 1943). Cf. Frank, supra note 84, at 639.
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acted in Indiana, Missouri, Illinois, and in other border states. Their
strategy had a political arm. The Union -as to be split politically, and
a Northwest Confederation was to be declared, friendly to the South,
and embracing Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Indiana and Minne-
sota. This plan was not an idle dream. It was sponsored by a well-
financed society, the Sons of Liberty, thought to have 300,000 meih-
bers, many of them rich and respectable; the planned uprising vould
coincide with the Chicago convention of the Democratic Party,
which was sympathetic to abandoning the war, and recognizing the
Confederacy.sO
The unanimous Court which freed Milligan for civil trial was a court
of fire-eating Unionists. Mr. Justice Davis, who wrote for the majority,
was one of President Lincbln's closest friends, supporters and admirers.
The Chief Justice, who wrote the opinion for the concurring minority,
was a valiant and resolute supporter of the war, whatever his short-
comings in other respects. The Court had no difficulty in freeing
Milligan, and facing down the outcry of radical Republicans which
was provoked by the decision. The issue dividing the Court in the
Milligan case was parallel in some ways to the problem presented by
the Japanese exclusion program under the statute of March 21, 1942.
Congress had passed a statute in 1863 permitting the President to
suspend the privilege of habeas corpus in a limited way whenever, in
his judgment, the public safety required it, holding prisoners without
trial for a short period. If the next sitting of the grand jury did not
indict those held in its district, they were entitled to release under the
statute.
The statute waiin fact a dead letter, although the Court did not con-
sider that aspect of the situation in deciding Milligan's case? Milligan
had been arrested by the military. The grand jury had not returned an
indictment against him at its next sitting. He had nonetheless been
tried by a military commission, and sentenced to death. The minority
of the Court urged his release according to the terms of the statute,
because no indictment had been presented against him. The Court,
however, freed him for normal criminal trial on broader grounds. The
controlling question of the case, the Court said, was whether the
military commission had jurisdiction to try Milligan. This question
was considered without express reference to the statute of 1863, as such,
but on the evidence which might justify the exercise of martial law
powers either under the statute or otherwise. The only constitutional
reason, the Court said, for denying Milligan the trial provided for in
the Third Article of the Constitution, and in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, is that such a trial could not physically be conducted.
86. See KLAus, THE MILLIGAN CASE (1929) 27-33.
87. See RANDALL, ComnTIuTioNAL PROBLEVS UNDEnLINCOLN (1926) 167.
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So long as the courts are open, persons accused of crime, and not subject
to the laws of war as members of the armed forces or enemy belligerents,
must be brought before the courts, or discharged. Ex parte Milligan
therefore holds Milligan's trial before a military commission to be un-
constitutional, despite the President's action under the first section of
the Act of 1863. The factual situation was not such as to justify the
exercise of martial law powers, even for temporary detention, and
certainly not for trial. Ordinary civilians could be held for military
trial only when the civil power was incapable of acting-during an
invasion, for example, or during a period of severe riot or insurrection.
"It is difficult to see how the safety of the country required
martial law in Indiana. If any of her citizens were plotting treason,
the power of arrest could secure them, until the government was
prepared for their trial, when the courts were open and ready to try
them. It was as easy to protect witnesses before a civil as a military
tribunal; and as there could be no wish to convict, except on suffi-
cient legal evidence, surely an ordained and established court was
better able to judge of this than a military tribunal composed of
gentlemen not trained to the profession of the law."
"It is claimed that martial law covers with its broad mantle the
proceedings of this military commission. The proposition is this:
that in a time of war the commander of an armed force (if in his
opinion the exigencies of the country demand it, and of which he is
to judge) has the power, within the lines of his military district, to
suspend all civil rights and their remedies, and subject citizens as
well as soldiers to the rule of his will; and in the exercise of his lawful
authority cannot be restrained, except by his superior officer or the
President of the United States.
"If this position is sound to the extent claimed, then when war
exists, foreign or domestic, and the country is subdivided into
military departments for mere convenience, the commander of one
of them can, if he chooses, within his limits, on the plea of necessity,
with the approval of the Executive, substitute military force for and
to the exclusion of the laws, and punish all persons, as he thinks
right and proper, without fixed or certain rules.
"The statement of this proposition shows its importance; for, if
true, republican government is a failure, and there is an end of
liberty regulated by law. Martial law, established on such a basis,
destroys every guarantee of the Constitution, and effectually
renders the 'military independent of and superior to the civil
power'-the attempt to do which by the King of Great Britain was
deemed by our fathers such an offence, that they assigned it to the
world as one of the causes which impelled them to declare their
independence. Civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot
endure together; the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the con-
flict, one or the other must perish." s
88. 4 Wall. 2, 127, 124-5 (U. S. 1867).
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The Court's dismissal of Ex parte Milligan in Ex parte Endo requires
some analysis. The Court said, "It should be noted at the outset that
we do not have here a question such as was presented in Ex parte
Mulligan, 4 Wall. 2, or in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, where the
jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of
war was challenged in habeas corpus proceedings. Mitsuye Endo is
detained by a civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority, not by
the military. Moreover, the evacuation program ias not left exclu-
sively to the military; the Authority -as given a large measure of
responsibility for its execution and Congress made its enforcement
subject to civil penalties by the Act of March 21, 1942. Accordingly,
no questions of military law are involved." 19
The proposition is extraordinary. Under penalty of imprisonment,
the orders before the Court in Ex parte Endo required that enemy
aliens and citizens of Japanese blood be removed from their home and
confined in camps. If found to be "disloyal," they were kept in the
camps indefinitely. If found to be "loyal," they were kept in the
camps as long as was necessary for the Authority to place them in
friendly communities.
The problems of Ex'parte Milligan are avoided by the simplest of
expedients. In Ex parte M1iligan the Court said that the military could
not constitutionally arrest, nor could a military tribunal constitu-
tionally try, civilians charged with treason and conspiracy to destroy
the state by force, at a time when the civil courts were open and func-
tioning. Under the plan considered in the Japanese American cases,
people not charged with crime are imprisoned for several years without
even a military trial, on the ground that they have the taint of Japanese
blood. Why doesn't the M11illigan case apply a fortiori? If it is illegal
to arrest and confine people after an unarranted military trial, it is
surely even more illegal to arrest and confine them without any trial
at all. The Supreme Court says that the issues of the Milligan case are
not involved because the evacuees were committed to camps by mili-
tary orders, not by military tribunals, and because their jailers did not
wear uniforms. It is hard to see any sequence in the sentences. The
Japanese Americans were ordered detained by a general, purporting
to act on military grounds. The military order was enforceable, on
pain of imprisonment. While a United States marshal, rather than a
military policeman, assured obedience to the order, the ultimate sanc-
tion behind the marshal's writ is the same as that of the military
police: the bayonets of United States troops. It is hardly a ground
for distinction that the general's command was backed by the penalty
of civil imprisonment, or that he obtained civilian aid in running the
relocation canps. The starting point for the program was a military
89. 323 U.S. 283, 297-8 (1944).
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order, which had to be obeyed. It required enemy aliens and citizens
of Japanese blood to be removed from their homes and confined in
camps. As events developed, the general's command imposed confine-
ment for three years on most of the people who were evacuated under it.
There are then two basic constitutional problems concealed in the
Court's easy dismissal of Ex parte Milligan: the arrest, removal and
confinement of persons without trial, pending examination of their
loyalty; and the indefinite confinement of persons found to be disloyal.
On both counts, at least as to citizens, the moral of Ex parte Milligan
is plain. The Milligan case says little about the propriety of a curfew,
or perhaps even of the exclusion orders as such. The military necessity
of such steps are to be tested independently in the light of all the
relevant circumstances. The Milligan case does say, however, that
arrest and confinement are forms of action which cannot be taken as
military necessities while courts are open. For such punitive measures
it proposes a clear and forceful rule of thumb: the protection of the
individual by normal trial does not under such circumstances interfere
with the conduct of war.
Much was made in the Japanese American cases of the analogy of
temporary preventive arrest or other restriction, approved for material
witnesses, the protection of the public at fires, the detention of typhoid
carriers, mentally ill persons, and so on." The analogy has little or no
application to the problems presented in these cases, except perhaps for
the curfew or conceivably the abstract issue of exclusion, as distin-
guished from detention. The restrictions involved here were not tem-
porary emergency measures, justified by the breakdown of more
orderly facilities for protecting society against espionage and sabotage.
As interferences with the liberty of the individual, they go well beyond
the minimal forms of precautionary arrest without warrant which were
permitted by the statute of 1863, discussed in the Milligan case; they
are closely comparable to the forms of arbitrary action which were
actually presented by the facts of the Milligan case, and strongly dis-
approved by the Court.
As for Japanese aliens, it is orthodox, though not very accurate, to
90. For temporary restrictions on access to localities see Warner, The Model Sabotage
Prevention Act (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 602, 611-8; Pressman, Leider and Cammer, Sabo-
tage and National Defense (1941) 54 HARV. L. REv. 632, 641. The confinement of alcoholics,
psychotic persons, and the like raises different problems. The issue in such cases is not
whether persons can be confined in the social interest without trial, but without trial by
jury. Ample individual investigation, hearings and other safeguards are required by way
of "due" process of law. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270 (1940);
see Hall, Drunkenness as a Criminal Offense (1942) 32 J. CRlM. L. & CRm. 297; Rostow,
The Commitment of Alcoholics to Medical Institutions (1940) 1 Q. J. OF STUDIES ON ALCOHOL
372. Moreover, the limits to such interferences with individual freedom in the name of
protecting society are jealously guarded. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); see
Note (1943) 3 Q. J. OF STUDIEs ON ALCOHOL 668.
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say that as persons of enemy nationality they are subject only to the
Government's will in time of war . But the protection of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments extends generally to aliens.02 Should arbitrary
distinctions be permitted in our policy for enemy aliens, distinctions
without reasonable basis? Is it permissible to intern all the Japanese
who live on the West Coast, but to allow German and Italian aliens,
and Japanese who live elsewhere, general freedom? Lower courts have
said they would refuse to review executive action directed at the
control of enemy aliens.9 3 Such a view is far from necessary. The courts
go to great lengths to assure reasonable protection to the property
rights of enemy aliens, their privilege of pursuing litigation, and the
like. It requires no extension of doctrine to propose that their control
and custody in time of war be reasonably equal, and even-handed. So
far as accepted notions of international law are concerned, the "single
aim" of specialized enemy alien controls is to prevent enemy aliens
from aiding the enemy.94 The present pattern of discriminatory con-
trols bears no relation to the end of safety.
V
These cases represent deep-seated and largely inarticulate responses
to the problems they raise. In part they express the justices' reluctance
to interfere in any way with the prosecution of the war. In part they
stem from widely shared fears and uncertainties about the technical
possibilities of new means of warfare. Such fears were strongly felt
everywhere on the Allied side after the German victories of 1940 and
1941. It was common then, and still is common, to believe in a vague
but positive way that the restoration of mobility in warfare, and the
appearance of new weapons, have somehow made all older thought on
the subject of war obsolete. We expected fifth-columns and paratroops
to drop near San Francisco at any moment. In the panic of the time,
it seemed almost rational to lock up Japanese Americans as potential
enemy agents.
91. See Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1316, 1317. Cf. 3 HYDE, IrTEr:ATIO.AL LAw
CHIEFLY As INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1945) §5 616-617;
De Lacey v. United States, 249 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913).
92. See ALEXANDER, RIGHTS OF ALIENS UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTrTrTIoz (1931)
127-9; GIBsoN, ALIENS AND THE LAW (1940) 151-2, c. 7; Oppanheimer, Tie Corwl.iu ional
Rights of Aliens (1941) 1 BILL OF RIGHTS REV. 100, 106.
93. Ev parle Graber, 247 Fed. 3S2 (N. D. Ala. 1918); E= parc Gilroy, 257 Fed. 110
(S. D. N. Y. 1919). However, the premise of these cases is hardly compatible vith that of
Sterling v. Constantin, but rather depends on the proposition that the exerci2 of executive
discretion in military and quasi-military matters is not reviewable, except for fraud, ni-
taken indentity, etc. See also cases cited supra note 13. The statute and regulation involved
in those cases applies to any persons, not only to citizens or friendly aliens.
94. See HYDE, loc. cit. supra note 91. As for the status of enemy aliens in court, se
Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69 (1942); as to the property of enemy aliens Eee Sympozium,
Enemy Properly (1945) 11 LAw & Co=mr. PrO. 1-201.
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But the airplane, the tank, and the rocket have not made it neces-
sary to abandon the principles of Ex parte'Milligan. Whatever the
effect of such developments may be on Infantry Field Regulations and
the Manual of Arms, they do not compel us to deny suspects the
right of trial, to hold people for years in preventive custody, or to
substitute military commissions for the civil courts. The need for
democratic control of the management of war has not been reduced by
advances in the technique of fighting. The accelerated rate of technical
advance emphasizes anew the importance of civil control to guard
against resistance to novelty, and the other occupational diseases of the
higher staffs of all armies. And as warfare becomes more dangerous,
and as it embraces more and more of the life of the community, the
problem of assuring a sensible choice of war policies, and of preserving
democratic social values under conditions of general mobilization,
becomes steadily more urgent.
What lies behind Ex parte Milligan, Mitchell v. Harmony, and
Sterling v. Constantin is the principle of responsibility. The war power
is the power to wage war successfully, as Chief Justice Hughes once re-
marked. But it is the power to wage -war, not a license to do unneces-
sary and dictatorial things in the name of the war power. The decision
as to where the boundaries of military discretion lie in particular cases
has to be made differently in different circumstances. Sometimes the
issue will arise in law suits, more often in courts martial, Congres-
sional investigations, reports of the Inspector General, or other law-
enforcement procedures. When a court confronts the problem of
determining the permissible limit of military discretion, it must test
the question by the same methods of judicial inquiry it uses in other
cases. There is no special reason why witnesses, depositions, cross-
examination and other familiar techniques of investigation are less
available in these cases than in others. As Mitchell v. Harmony and
many other cases indicate, Mr. Justice Jackson is plainly wrong in
asserting that judicial control of military discretion is impossible.
Mr. Justice Jackson said:
"The limitation under which courts always will labor in examin-
ing the necessity for a military order are illustrated by this case.
How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable
basis in necessity? No evidence whatever on that subject has been
taken by this or any other court. There is sharp controversy as to
the credibility of the DeWitt report. So the Court, having no real
evidence before it, has no choice but to accept General DeWitt's
own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-
examination, that what he did was reasonable. And thus it will
always be when courts try to look into the reasonableness of a
military order." 9'
95. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 245 (1944). See procedure in Ex parle
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The Supreme Court had a real alternative in the Koremnatsu case: it
could have remanded for trial on the necessity of the orders. The
courts have found no special difficulty, in investigating such questions,
and there is no reason why they should.
The first and greatest anomaly of the Hirabayash, Korerzatsu and
Endo cases is that they seem to abandon the requirement of a judicial
inquiry into the factual justification for General DeWitt's decisions.
Despite the careful language of the Chief Justice, these cases treat the
decisions of military officials, unlike those of other government officers,
as almost immune from ordinary rules of public responsibility. The
judges were convinced by the ipse dixit of a general, not the factual
record of a court proceeding. On this ground alone, the Japanese
American cases should be most strenuously reconsidered.
An appropriate procedure for reviewing decisions taken in the name
of the war power is an indispensable step towards assuring a sensible
result. But the ultimate problem left by these cases is not one of pro-
cedure. In these cases the Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld a decision to incarcerate 100,000 people for a term of several
years. The reason for this action was the extraordinary proposition
that all persons of Japanese ancestry are enemies, that the war is not
directed at the Japanese state, but at the Japanese "race." General
DeWitt's views on this subject are formally presented in his Final
Recommendations and his Final Report to the War Department."
They are reiterated in his later testimony to a subcommittee of the
Naval Affairs Committee. After testifying about soldier delinquency
and other problems involving the welfare of his troops, General DeWitt
was asked whether he had any suggestions he wanted to leave with the
Congressmen. He responded:
"I haven't any except one-that is the development of a false
sentiment on the part of certain individuals and some organiza-
tions to get the Japanese back on the west coast. I don't want any
of them here. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to
determine their loyalty. The west coast contains too many vital
installations essential to the defense of the country to allow any
Japanese on this coast. There is a feeling developing, I think, in
certain sections of the country that the Japanese should be allowed
to return. I am opposing it with every proper means at my dis-
posal."
MR. BATES: "I was going to ask-would you base your deter-
mined stand on experience as a result of sabotage or racial history
or what is it?"
Duncan as described in Frank, supra note 84, at 649; General W\ilbur has been a v;itnez3 in
the individua! exclusion proceedings against one Ochikubo, now pending. See Pacific Citi-
zen, March 17, 1945, p. 2, col. 1.
96. Seesupra, pp.520-1.
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GENERAL DEWiTT: "I first of all base it on my responsibility. I
have the mission of defending this coast and securing vital installa-
tions. The danger of the Japanese was, and is now-if they are per-
mitted to come back-espionage and sabotage. It makes no differ-
ence whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese.
American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty."
MR. BATES: "You draw a distinction then between Japanese
and Italians and Germans? We have a great number of Italians
and Germans and we think they are fine citizens. There may be
exceptions."
GENERAL. DEWirT: "You needn't worry about the Italians at all
except in certain cases. Also, the same for the Germans except in
individual cases. But we must worry about the Japanese all the
time until he is wiped off the map. Sabotage and espionage will
make problems as long as he is allowed in this area-problems
which I don't want to have to worry about."
97
The Japanese exclusion program thus rests on five propositions of the
utmost potential menace: (1) protective custody, extending over three
or four years, is a permitted form of imprisonment in the United
States; (2) political opinions, not criminal acts, may contain enough
clear and present danger to justify such imprisonment; (3) men, women
and children of a given ethnic group, both Americans and resident
aliens, can be presumed to possess the kind of dangerous ideas which
require their imprisonment; (4) in time of war or emergency the mili-
tary, perhaps without even the concurrence of the legislature, can
decide what political opinions require imprisonment, and which ethnic
groups are infected with them; and (5) the decision of the military can
be carried out without indictment, trial, examination, jury, the con-
frontation of witnesses, counsel for the defense, the privilege against
self-incrimination, or any of the other safeguards of the Bill of Rights.
The idea of punishment only for individual behavior is basic to all
systems of civilized law. A great principle was never lost so casually.
Mr. Justice Black's comment was weak to the point of impotence:
"Hardships are a part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships." 98
It was an answer ifi the spirit of cliche: "Don't you know there's a war
going on?" It is hard to reconcile with the purposes of his dissent in
Williams v. North Carolina, where he said that a conviction for bigamy
in North Carolina of two people who had been validly divorced and
remarried in Nevada "makes of human liberty a very cheap thing-too
cheap to be consistent with the principles of free government." 11
97. tIearing, before Subcommittee of House Committee on Naval Affairs on H. R. 30, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 739-40. The text of the testimony is given somewhat differently
from current newspaper reports in McWILLIAMxS, PREJUDIPE (1944) 116.
98. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
99. Williamsv. North Carolina, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 1116 (U. S. 1945).
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That the Supreme Court has upheld imprisonment on such a basis
constitutes an expansion of military discretion beyond the limit of
tolerance in democratic society. It ignores the rights of citizenship,
and the safeguards of trial practice which have been the historical at-
tributes of liberty. Beyond that, it is an injustice, and therefore, like
the trials of Sacco, Vanzetti, and Dreyfus, a threat to society, and to
all men. 'We believe that the German people bear a common political
responsibility for outrages secretly committed by the Gestapo and
the SS. What are we to think of our own part in a program which
violates every democratic social value, yet has been approved by the
Congress, the President and the Supreme Court?
Three forms of reparation are available, and should be pursued. The
first is the inescapable obligation of the Federal Government to protect
the civil rights of Japanese Americans against organized and unor-
ganized hooliganism. If local law enforcement fails, prosecutions under
the Civil Rights Act should be undertaken.' Secondly, generous
financial indemnity should be sought, for the Japanese Americans have
suffered and will suffer heavy property losses as a consequence of their
evacuation. Finally, the basic issues should be presented to the Su-
preme Court again, in an effort to obtain a reversal of these war-time
cases. In the history of the Supreme Court there have been important
occasions when the Court itself corrected a decision occasioned by the
excitement of a tense and patriotic moment. After the end of the Civil
War, Ex parte Vallandigham'0 ' was followed by Ex parte Milligan. The
Gobitis case has recently been overruled by West Virginia v. Barnelle.102
Similar public expiation in the case of the internment of Japanese Amer-
icans from the West Coast would be good for the Court, and for the
country.
100. 18 U. S. C. §§ 51, 52 (Criminal Code §§ 19, 20) (1940); Hague v CIO, 307 U. S. 496
(1939); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941). Cf. Screv.-a v. United States, 65 Sup.
Ct. 1031 (U. S. 1945).
101. 1 Wall. 243 (U. S. 1863).
102. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 536 (1940); West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
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